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Abstract 
 
After a history of hostility toward Black people, what motivated the Democratic Party of the 
1960s to change its position on civil rights? My dissertation examines one of the most significant 
developments in American political history—the shift of the U.S. political parties on racial 
issues. In Relocation and Realignment: How the Great Migration changed the face of the 
Democratic Party, I argue that increasing competition between the parties for the presidency and 
the mass movement of Black people out of the South coincided to drive the Democratic Party’s 
change on racial issues. Through examination of primary sources and a fresh perspective on 
existing research, I show that the Democratic Party changed their stance in an effort to secure 
support from Black voters in the North—who often constituted the balance of power (BOP) in 
important elections. Relocation and Realignment is an important contribution to the study of 
American politics for its attention to the political impact of the Great Migration and for its focus 
on Black voters before the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 
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 Introduction 
If you talk to Black people about politics, many will say the Democratic Party has been 
supportive of the race for as long as they can remember. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s (FDR) New 
Deal programs provided food, shelter and work for many Black people during the Great 
Depression. Harry Truman desegregated the military. John F. Kennedy (JFK) called Coretta 
Scott King after Martin Luther King, Jr.’s arrest during a protest in Atlanta, Georgia. At the 
height of the Civil Rights Movement, Democratic President Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) signed the 
Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts. Bill Clinton was so well-accepted by the Black community 
that many referred to him as the “first Black president.” Furthermore, the actual first Black 
President of the United States, Barack Obama, is a Democrat. For all these reasons, it makes 
sense that a Black person living in our times might reflect on American political history and 
surmise that the Democratic Party is “the party of Black people.” However, the Party has not 
always engendered such positive emotions in this community. 
Before FDR and the New Deal, the Democratic Party was mostly a party of states’ rights. 
The most powerful faction within the party, Southern Democrats, favored limited government 
intervention on civil rights, believing each state should decide these issues for themselves. The 
result was a country with extremely different practices and policies on racial issues. A system of 
segregation and discrimination persisted in the South, including disparities in housing, 
employment, accommodations and education. In politics, this faction worked to deny Black 
citizens their constitutional right to participate in the political system. They employed legal 
methods, like the White primary, and extralegal methods, like violence and intimidation. In 
Congress, Southern Democrats worked with northern business interests to constitute a 
 2 
conservative coalition whose goal was to block all progress on a host of liberal projects, 
especially anything related to civil rights legislation. 
Factional struggles in the Democratic Party intensified as the northern wing of the party 
became increasingly liberal. Many Democrats in the North were advocating for anti-
discrimination and fair employment policies. Outside the South, Black Democratic candidates 
were running for and winning local and state political offices. The Party’s presidents and 
presidential candidates were meeting with leaders of the Black community in an effort to 
understand their concerns and gain their support. Despite having a party power base that was 
heavily southern and racially conservative, the Democratic Party of the 1960s embraced liberal 
positions on racial issues. By 1965, the Party had undergone a nearly complete reversal on Black 
issues.  
Why would the national Democratic Party of the 1960s, which still had a heavily 
conservative base in the South, move to the Left on issues related to race? This question is 
especially interesting because the Democrats could potentially lose Southern support by taking 
these liberal positions. In this dissertation, I seek to expand upon our current understandings of 
the Party’s motivation to change positions on civil rights issues—in spite of this potential for 
loss—by examining the role of demographic change in shaping party strategy. 
Political scientists, historians, journalists, and other informed observers have many 
explanations as to why the Party changed its position on Black issues. Mary Dudziak (2001) 
suggests American leaders moderated on civil rights issues in an attempt to save face on the 
national stage.  On this account, support for racism at home made political leaders vulnerable to 
international claims of hypocrisy. Social movements scholar Doug McAdams argues that the 
Civil Rights Movement was an important motivator of politicians position change. Calls from 
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leaders in the Movement and protests throughout the nation forced politicians to evolve on civil 
rights. 
There are also more personal descriptions of the position change. Journalists and keepers 
of the JFK and LBJ presidential legacies suggest that they changed positions as they experienced 
changes of heart. For JFK, they point to the 1963 desegregation of the University of Alabama 
and surrounding protest as the moment that changed everything.
1
 LBJ people frequently point to 
his work teaching Mexican schoolchildren as an indicator that he was sympathetic to civil rights 
all along. On a different personal note, Caro (2012) discusses LBJ’s ambition for the presidency 
as a primary motivation for his position change. 
The classic political science explanation is that Democrats changed in response to elite 
replacement among members of Congress (Carmines & Stimson, 1989). In this view, the Party’s 
position on civil rights changed when liberals replaced conservative members of Congress in the 
1958 election. Critiques of Issue Evolution suggest other factors motivated change: they changed 
their position because of ideological commitments that led to liberal positions on race (Feinstein 
& Schickler, 2008) and “prodding from the party’s core coalitional allies” (Schickler, Pearson 
and Feinstein, 2010: 673). Karol (2009) suggests the change occurred after large numbers of 
Black people joined the party during the New Deal. On his account, many Northern Democrats 
won their seats in Congress on FDR’s coattails. They shifted positions to support Black issues to 
demonstrate their liberalism and sustain their election to office (Karol, 2009: 109). 
What about this Black population in the North that House members changed to 
accommodate? Where did they come from, and how did they become important enough to 
                                                 
1
For a classic example of this narrative, see: Horan, Kelly and Hicks, George (Host). (2013, November 19). JFK’s Civil Rights 
Reluctance Ends With. [Radio broadcast]. Boston, MA: National Public Radio. Retrieved from: 
http://www.wbur.org/2013/11/19/jfk-civil-rights-address. Last accessed April 22, 2014. 
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warrant consideration of elected officials? Although most accounts of Democratic Party 
development include a brief discussion of demographic changes during the time, none of them 
thoroughly considers these questions. From the turn of the century through the 1960s, millions of 
Black people left the South and settled in cities throughout the North in search of economic 
opportunity and freedom from racial subjugation. This movement occurred steadily over more 
than 60 years, but sustained considerable momentum from World War II onward. All of the 
aforementioned scholars acknowledge this mass movement of Black people. However, no works 
consider the political impact of this movement at length. It is imperative that political scientists 
and historians recognize the Great Migration as essential to understanding party change from the 
1940s onward. 
Why Not Consider The Great Migration? 
Why is the Great Migration missing as a major explanation for change? There are at least 
two reasons the migration has a diminished role among recent scholarship. One is that movement 
of citizens throughout the country is not usually cause for major concern or attention at the 
national level. If migration follows a normal pattern, and abnormal forces do not draw large 
numbers of people to particular places, parties do not need to think deeply about the movement 
of citizens because it will not have a strong impact on the way they create electoral strategy. In 
other words, migration among citizens should not become important to the national party until it 
starts to affect Electoral College (EC) outcomes.
2
 
                                                 
2
 Local politics could be a different situation. The movement of citizens is a concern for states and localities, which are more 
likely to be affected by shifts in their population. However, if migration proceeds normally—without being skewed by the 
migrants’ decision to settle in a particular part of the state or locality—it could also make sense that movement into or out of a 
state is not a major concern for parties at the state and local level. 
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However, America’s Great Migration was different from all other types of migration in 
our history because it was not normal and did affect politics. Abnormal forces ranging from boll 
weevil outbreaks and a struggling southern economy to the search for a life free from 
discrimination drove large numbers of Black people out of the south.  
Further, although citizens of the United States are supposed to have the same voting 
privileges throughout the country, voting privileges were not widely available to people of color 
before 1965. It was much easier for a Black person in the North to participate in politics than it 
was for her southern counterparts. Therefore, the movement caused by the Great Migration 
would have greater political implications for party politics than would any similar type of 
movement among another group of the nation’s citizens. A thorough analysis of the Great 
Migration would serve to strengthen the party change literature by providing a different 
perspective of the party’s motivations. Also important is that the immigrants effectively gained 
the opportunity to participate in government for the first time. For these reasons, it makes sense 
to consider this demographic development as a motivator of party change.  
The second reason scholars have neglected the Great Migration is because mainstream 
scholars systematically ignore Black voters. (For an extensive discussion of the absence of Black 
people in the study of race in American politics, see Harris-Lacewell, 2003). Specifically, 
scholars have not considered Black voters as an important and drastically changing part of the 
coalition during the period. Most make the case that Black alignment with the Democratic Party 
had stabilized by 1936. They frequently focus on the labor and White Liberal lobbies as the most 
important forces driving party change. Although these groups are vital to the story, they are not 
the only groups working for change. 
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I will explain how the Great Migration, along with electoral instability, motivated the 
Democrats to change their position on civil rights issues between 1948 and 1964 both at the 
national and sub-national levels. Two ideas shape my conception of the Party’s change. First, 
electoral outcomes, especially losses, motivate party change. Democrats faced increasing 
competition in elections during the post-war period. President Truman won the 1948 presidential 
election by the narrowest margin among Democrats since 1932 and in both 1952 and 1956 
Democrats lost their bids for the presidency. Democrats won the 1960 presidential election by 
one of the smallest margins in American political history. After 1960, the national party was 
looking for ways to ensure its ability to win. 
Second, change generally consists of reshaping party coalitions—even when the change 
includes some costs.
3
  In this instance, the Democrats were a party divided. The Northern wing 
of the party wanted to move forward on civil rights while the Southern wing fought desperately 
to maintain states’ rights. With every step towards civil rights, Democrats faced continuing loss 
of white voters in the South. From 1948-1964, Democrats tried to balance their desire to gain 
support from Black voters with their desire to maintain control of the South. However, 
Democrats found it impossible to keep both of these factions happy. 
In the 1948 election, Democrats learned that it was possible to win the presidency 
without wholesale support from the South. As Democratic presidential candidates looked for 
ways to win beyond 1948, they realized that migrants could helpful in reshaping their coalitions. 
The new Northern Black voters were a good source of votes because they were often engaging in 
                                                 
3
 Parties may deviate from their currently stated positions on issues under two conditions: 1) the political party experiences a loss 
and/or 2) the party determines that a change in position would deliver a new or different and meaningful share of the vote. This 
view of parties is important because it reinforces parties as active bodies, who use their policy positions to shape electorates for 
their benefit. 
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politics for the first time.  They also lived in very important places for presidential electoral 
strategy.  Further, Black voters’ support for expansion of government powers put them in line 
with recent Democratic policy shifts toward support for expansion of federal government. 
My Argument 
The Great Migration provided Democrats with the perfect opportunity to maximize on 
their relationship with Black voters. The influx of Black voters in the North reached its peak just 
as Democrats experienced electoral challenges in the post-war period. Further, migrants were 
geographically concentrated in the largest cities of the largest states, and many of them had weak 
attachments to the major political parties. These factors made migrants important to Democrats 
at the local and national level. Locally, Democrats courted Black voters with policy changes that 
were responsive to their needs and supported Black candidates. The national Democratic Party 
recognized Black voters’ potential impact and sought to harness that power for the national party 
coalition during the elections of the 1940s-1960s. They responded with executive orders and 
outreach to Black voters through their party platforms and presidential campaigns. 
To the debates in the discipline between elite replacement (Carmines & Stimson, 1989) 
and coalition management (Karol, 2009; Pearson, Feinstein & Schickler, 2010), we should add 
the Petrocik (1981) and Andersen (1979) models, which conceptualize change as a response to 
transformations in the electorate. I argue that the development of the Democratic Party’s stance 
on racial issues is an instance of realignment caused by expansion of the electorate and 
mobilization of a previously inactive population. While I acknowledge that there are many other 
factors in the environment that contribute to the party’s change and to Black voters growing 
affinity for Democrats, my focus here is the impact of the Great Migration. In the following 
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section, I outline my idea about party change by suggesting that loss motivates change and that 
other factors constrain the type of change parties undertake. 
Dealing with Electoral Loss 
Parties have the strongest incentive to change their behavior when they lose elections. 
Like others before me, I assume that electoral victory is the primary goal of political parties 
(Downs, 1957; Schattschneider, 1960). “Thus all of a party’s actions are aimed at maximizing 
votes and it treats policies merely as a means toward this end” (Downs, 1957: 35). In other 
words, “parties formulate policies in order to win elections rather than win elections in order to 
formulate policies” (Downs, 1957: 28). Specifically, parties take positions that will allow them to 
attract a compatible coalition (Karol, 2009). As they work to construct winning coalitions, parties 
focus on particular groups of voters whose support they believe will be most helpful toward the 
goal of meeting the institutional requirements necessary for attaining a position.  
Rules Constrain Parties 
Parties decide to change their positions based on losses, but they do not change 
arbitrarily. The rules of the EC constrain presidential parties and candidates’ behaviors as they 
choose which states to target and which voters they should seek. Presidential candidates rarely 
debate the facts of the EC system on the road to the presidency because the requirements for 
winning the Presidency of the United States are clear. A presidential candidate must earn a 
majority of votes in order to be elected president. To obtain these votes, a presidential candidate 
must win the popular vote of the state.
4
 If no candidate is successful in reaching a majority, the 
House of Representatives decides the election. Although presidential candidates may like to win 
                                                 
4
 Maine and Nebraska are exceptions. These states distribute their electors by electoral districts where candidates must win the 
popular vote in the district to take the Electoral College votes for the district. 
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as many votes as possible, EC strategy is the basis of their approach to winning votes. Parties 
make changes to their coalitions that further the goal of achieving a majority of votes in the EC.
5
 
Scott James describes this approach in Presidents, Parties and the State (2006). He 
writes, 
“political competition for the presidency induces political parties to give 
disproportionate political attention to those states that hold the balance of power 
in the Electoral College. Typically, this means making substantive appeals to 
disaffected groups either within one’s own party, the major-party opposition, or 
attached to third-party organizations” (15). 
The same logic behind the strategic pursuit of votes applies at the local level. Politicians 
are constrained by the rules of their election. As vote seekers, they take positions and interact 
with voters in ways that increase the likelihood they will win their elections. Candidates who are 
running for smaller, more homogeneous seats—ward or council seats, for example—take 
positions tailored to suit the concerns and desires of that seat. On the other hand, candidates who 
have to account for larger segments of the population—in citywide elections for example—may 
moderate their positions to achieve election.  
The Democratic Party’s change in the post-war era fits James’s conception of party 
strategy. Although Black men were granted the right to vote with the 15
th
 amendment and Black 
women received the right to vote with the 19
th
 amendment, the vast majority of them were not 
able to exercise that right. When they left the South, more of them were able to participate in 
politics. Because many of the migrants to the North were participating in politics for the first 
time, they fit the aforementioned description of a disaffected group. If Black voters were the 
BOP for elections in the postwar period, it should follow that the Democratic Party would have 
                                                 
5
 As Democrats sought to remain competitive, they faced declining shares of the popular vote in presidential elections. 
Simultaneously, the flood of Black people into the North created an incentive for elites to take liberal positions on race. The 
recent revisions to the American politics account of this change acknowledge, but do not explore, the connection between the 
Democratic Party’s losses and this mass migration.  
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incentive to become more liberal on civil rights as a way to “make substantive appeals” to this 
voting bloc. In chapters four and five of this work, I show that Black voters were the BOP in 
many elections.  
The size of the Black voting bloc made them important. Adding to their importance was 
the fact that migrants poured into states that were extremely important to parties as they sought 
to compete in the EC. Unlike most of the Southern states, participation from a large group of 
new voters in one of the major cities could sway the outcome of elections in states like 
Pennsylvania and Illinois. I show that the Great Migration affected politics because Black people 
often voted as a swing bloc and lived in electorally important places, thereby affecting 
calculations of presidential campaigns and having the potential to determine the outcome of 
those states. 
Although they were supporting the Democratic Party in presidential elections by 1936, 
their support for Democrats was not absolute. At the national level, many Black voters returned 
to the GOP after the FDR and Truman presidencies. At the local level, they demonstrated the 
ability to differentiate between their support for the party at the national and local levels—often 
showing support for local parties who were friendly toward their issues and withholding that 
support when they felt slighted or ignored by a party organization. 
Parties Make Calculations and Seek Similarities 
Parties are especially interested in reaching groups whose ideological positions most 
closely align with what they are currently doing. For example, the 2012 Republican Party may 
have pursued Hispanic voters based on their numbers, but they also considered how the political 
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views of the group would fit with their existing coalition.
6
 In terms of this project, the national 
Democratic Party of the post-war period was aware that Black voters presented a unique 
opportunity because of their numbers. Moreover, based on their reaction to the New Deal, 
Democrats also understood that Black voters might be a group who was amenable to the new 
positions of the party—which increasingly advocated for expansion in the role of the federal 
government.
7
 While Democrats were very concerned to keep hold of their Southern base, they 
were also working to increase their numbers of Black voters based on their potential importance 
in the EC and ideological similarities. 
Methods 
Data 
My methodological approach is primarily historical analysis, with some simple 
quantitative analysis. My goal is to show how politicians were motivated to modify their 
behavior based on changes in their electoral fortunes and demographic composition of states. 
The best way to understand the electoral considerations of political actors during the period of 
interest is to analyze information they would have used. The goal of recreating the information 
environment of 1932-1960 led me to four types of information: popular and EC vote totals, 
media accounts and analyses of politics, census data and archival data. I argue that political 
actors are most concerned with winning. Therefore, I examine results from immediate past 
elections using a dataset of all presidential and congressional elections looking at the party’s 
percentage of the popular vote as well as its standing in the EC over time. To explain changes in 
                                                 
6
 Republicans thought they might be able to connect with Hispanic voters by tailoring their message on a number of issues, 
including: religion, jobs, housing and immigration reform (after the Republican primary elections). 
7
 Although I acknowledge that parties have more considerations than electoral math, the major focus of this project is the impact 
of a large shift in the population. Therefore, the following analysis focuses on the Democratic Party’s strategic, numerical 
calculations more than it considers the debates between the party’s factions over ideology. 
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the Black population, I use the Detailed Characteristics of the Population section of the U.S. 
censes from 1930-1970. To get a real-time account of party strategy and reaction to changes in 
the environment, I used ProQuest to find relevant articles in the New York Times, The 
Washington Post and Chicago Defender. Black magazines, specifically Jet Magazine, were 
helpful toward the goal of locating the names and dates served of Black office holders in 
northern cities. Archival data from the JFK and LBJ presidential libraries provided insight as to 
the priorities of presidents as they sought to win re-election campaigns. Finally, a large number 
of secondary sources were helpful to provide supplementary information as well as context for 
many of the primary sources. 
Period of Interest 
Although the entire history of Democratic Party stability/instability is interesting, my 
period of interest is 1948 through 1964.
8
 My primary reason for choosing this period is two-fold. 
First, this timeframe is just before the height of the Civil Rights Movement and the universally 
accepted marriage of the Democratic Party to Black issues. Second, scholars less frequently 
focus on this important time in the story of party change. Most of the work about the shift in 
party interactions with Black voters focuses either on the New Deal era (Weiss, 1983; Sitkoff, 
1972) or the period between the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the 1980s (Edsall 
& Edsall, 1992; Frymer, 1999). The New Deal is a logical focus of analysis because Black 
voters’ shift to the Democratic Party began during this period. The period after 1965 is also 
important in understanding this story of party change because Black people began to participate 
politically in large numbers after the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Although these two periods are 
                                                 
8
 For a thorough examination of this history see: Sundquist (1983); Ware (2006); Black & Black (2002); Leuchtenburg (2007); 
and Brewer and Stonecash (2010). 
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very important, and works about them have greatly contributed to our understanding of Black 
political behavior, the period from 1948-1964 also merits study. Third, this period is the height 
of the Great Migration and included more people although it is less frequently studied. In sum, 
these years are important because of the changing environment caused by the Great Migration 
and because the competition between both parties to secure Black votes is unmatched in 
American political history. 
Each of the chapters has a different focus, as appropriate for its analyses. To measure 
Democratic decline in chapter two, I begin in 1900 and go through 1960. That period provides 
sufficient time to demonstrate the downward trend Democrats faced and sets the stage for the 
central argument in chapter five that Black people were moving into the most electorally 
important states in large enough numbers to be important to the Democratic Party’s electoral 
calculus at various levels. The third chapter considers the two waves of the Great Migration, with 
a specific attention to the second wave—which takes place from the end of World War II 
through the 1960s. In chapter four, which is focused on local government, I consider 1946-1962. 
Chapter five, which is about the national impact of the Great Migration, covers 1948-1964. 
Level of Analysis 
The project deals with Black political interactions at the national and sub-national levels. 
In the national government chapter, my focus is the behavior of presidential parties and 
candidates because these actors have the greatest ability to shape national party positions on 
political issues, especially during campaigns. I also recognize the importance of sub-national 
elections. Democrats at the local level were first to interact with migrants after they left the 
South. In chapter four, I will argue these grass-roots interactions changed local election officials’ 
public positions on racial issues before those changes occurred on the national level.  
 14 
Earlier, I suggested political parties and presidential candidates in the United States must 
be strategic in their pursuit of votes because they are constrained by the EC system. This makes 
some places in the nation more important to parties than others. In the second chapter, I focus on 
the large EC states (henceforth referred to as large EC states) and states with close margins of 
victory. In chapter five, I consider the nation as a whole, with some attention to regions. 
Regions 
The concept of region is important to this analysis for a few reasons. First, regions 
provide a lens through which parties may view their national strategy. Second, they are important 
as a way to understand the movement and political involvement of Black people during the 
period of interest. Finally, region is important to consider the group of states Black people 
choose when migrating from the South. In my discussion of migration, South refers to all 
confederate states plus Kentucky and Oklahoma.
9
 North refers to all states outside the South. In 
the second and fifth chapters, I further separate regions to include Midwest and West. The 
regional breakdown of the project is depicted in figure 0.1, below. 
                                                 
9 
Kentucky and Oklahoma are included because they were slave territories.
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Figure 0.1: U.S. Regions, as defined for this project 
 
The Balance of Power 
The BOP refers to a group of people who have the potential to change the outcome of an 
election. Because their votes could affect the outcome, parties have to work harder for the vote of 
a BOP group. In many instances, people recognized the importance of the Black population and 
referred to them as the BOP. This reference suggests that when the rest of the population divides 
evenly, Black voters have the potential to determine the outcome of an election if they vote as a 
bloc. The idea of Black people as the BOP in politics goes back to their entrance into American 
politics during the reconstruction era. In a speech where he sought to persuade Southerners to 
unite, Henry Grady said: 
“The very worst thing that could happen to the South is to have her white vote 
divided into factions, and each faction bidding for the negro who holds the 
balance of power. What is this negro vote? In every Southern State it is 
considerable, and I fear it is increasing.”
10
 
                                                 
10
 Shurter, Edwin D. (1910) The Complete Orations and Speeches of Henry W. Grady. “The Solid South” pp. 71-72. Hinds, 
Noble & Eldredge. New York.  Grady, a journalist, was known as the “Spokesman of the New South.” 
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The most extensive work on Black voters as the BOP came later from Henry Lee Moon, 
in his 1948 book Balance of Power: The Negro Vote. Moon and the NAACP calculated the 
balance of power for the 1940 and 1944 elections. Moon, through his work at the NAACP, 
referred to the Black population as the BOP as a way to persuade political parties and candidates 
that the Black population should be top priority (and to argue parties should change their 
positions to appease this very important group of voters).
11
 
People outside the NAACP also argued that Black voters were the BOP. For example, in 
a Collier’s article about the 1956 election, Theodore White describes the importance of the Black 
vote in terms of Black voters’ placement in large cities with large EC counts. 
“What suddenly draws all political attention to the Negroes in 1956, however, is 
their phenomenal concentration in the queen cities of five of the biggest voting 
states of the country: New York, California, Pennsylvania, Illinois and Michigan. 
These states cast 156 electoral votes, or just 110 short of a Presidential majority. 
And in the great cities of these states, the Negro population percentage runs from 
a high of 21 per cent in Philadelphia (Mayor Richardson Dilworth unofficially 
sets it higher, at 25 per cent) through 19 per cent in Detroit, 17 per cent in 
Chicago, 11 per cent (excluding Puerto Ricans, who represent another 6 per cent) 
in New York, 11 per cent in Los Angeles.”
12
 
The Black population was particularly important during the post-war period because of 
their location and because many of them were entering the political world as new participants. 
One of my goals for this project was to see whether Moon and the NAACP’s logic about Black 
voters as the BOP holds beyond the 1944 election he analyzed in his book. If Moon and the 
NAACP were correct in their assertion regarding the BOP in important elections, it makes sense 
that parties would be overly concerned with pleasing Black voters. In other words, demonstrating 
                                                 
11
 W.E.B. DuBois also referred to Black voters as the BOP. 
12
 White, T. H., August 1956, “The Negro Voter: Can He Elect a President?” Collier’s, p. 19. Available at: 
http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/6331/. Last accessed March 31, 2014. 
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that Black voters were the BOP in elections would strengthen my argument about migration 
influencing politics. 
I adapt Moon’s formula to determine BOP in presidential elections from 1948- 1964. In 
short, Black voters are the balance of power if the number of Black people in the voting age 
population is greater than the margin of victory in an election.  
Blacks = BOP if  
BVAP > Numerical Margin
13
 
 
Where the numerical margin: 
NUMERICAL MARGIN = (Actual Democratic Vote+ Actual Republican Vote)/2 +(1)- 
Actual number of Republican Votes 
or 
Margin= (ADV+ARV)/2 +(1)- ARV 
 
For the numerical margin, I add the actual number of votes for Democrats to the actual 
number of votes for Republicans. Then, I divided the total of the actual vote counts by two. The 
result of the first two steps is the total number of votes needed to attain exactly half of the vote of 
the major parties. Because candidates must attain a majority of the vote plus one (1) vote, I add 
one (1) to the sum of Democratic and Republican votes. Finally, I subtract the number of 
Republican votes. The result is a numerical margin by which the Democratic Party won the 
election. A negative output represents the numerical margin by which the Republicans won the 
election. 
From the 1940s-1960s, the Democrats faced declining vote shares and losses in 
presidential elections. Therefore, they changed their behavior to focus on large EC states that 
might be open to supporting their position. They also mobilized a new group of voters who were 
the BOP in elections—Black migrants. 
                                                 
13
 The numerical margin is adapted from Balance of Power: The Negro Vote by Henry Lee Moon. See page 240, appendix IV. 
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Outline of the Dissertation 
In the first chapter, I review the literature on change in political parties. I begin by 
describing the conventional account of political change—realignment. Then, I describe 
realignment as expansion of the electorate and outline other instances of expansions in American 
politics. Finally, I describe the Great Migration as an instance of expansion of the electorate and 
propose it is an important part of the story of realignment in the post-war era.  
The second chapter describes the Democratic Party’s electoral position from 1900 to 
1960, with a focus on 1932 to 1956. My goal in this chapter is to give a broad sense of how the 
Democrats performed against the Republicans over a long period, leading up to the party’s 
position change. I propose that the Democrats’ position as a winning party during the 1930s and 
1940s was relatively new to them. Upon seeing their newfound success slip away after the New 
Deal, they were prepared to do anything to get back to winning—including expanding their 
coalition to align with Black voters.  
The Great Migration is the subject of the third chapter. My goal is to help the reader 
understand the details of this demographic change. Relying on secondary sources, I describe the 
total migration, with special focus on the second wave of the migration from 1941-1965. The 
factors that drove migrants out of the South would become important to their view on and 
expectations of politics when they arrived in the North. Therefore, this chapter also includes 
information about the stimuli for migrants’ decisions to move, their expectations for northern life 
and what they found when they arrived. 
Chapter four is about the impact of the Great Migration on local politics. My goal is to 
suggest that Democrats first felt the migrants’ impact at the local level and that their influence 
bubbled up to the national party over time. I examine five northern cities: Chicago, Detroit, Los 
Angeles, New York and Philadelphia to show the increasing influence of migrants. For each of 
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these cities, I establish whether Black voters were the BOP in state and local elections by using 
census data to estimate the number of Black people in northern cities who might have been 
eligible to vote—the Black Voting Age Population (BVAP). I then argue that Black voters would 
have been influential in some local elections by comparing the BVAP to the margin of victory in 
elections. I confirm their importance in elections through journalistic accounts and secondary 
sources. I also consider migrants’ influence on the party in terms of their ability to win elected 
office.  
The goal of the fifth chapter is to show that Black voters were also the BOP at the 
national level and that the presidential wing of the Democratic Party (Democratic Presidents and 
presidential candidates) recognized them as such. I refer back to census data to show that Black 
voters were the BOP in some national elections. Through analysis of popular and EC vote 
counts, I argue there were enough Black voters living in electorally important states to change 
the outcome of the EC in the 1948 and 1960 elections. Then, using archival documents from the 
LBJ and JFK presidential libraries, I show that the Democratic Party was actively working to 
bring Black voters into their coalition through voter registration efforts and by taking liberal 
policy positions on race. 
Finally, in the conclusion, I discuss other relevant cases of demographic change as a 
motivator of party change. I pay special attention to the growth and location of America’s 
Hispanic population as a potential motivator of party position change during the 2012 
presidential election. I also briefly discuss the potential political impact of the current return 
migration of Black Americans to the South.
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 Chapter One: Models of Party Change 
There is renewed interest in the study of politics during the post-war and Civil Rights 
Era. New scholarship questions the traditional accounts of change in the Democratic Party on 
civil right issues, which asserts that Democratic Party presidents and presidential candidates 
moved to the Left on racial issues in response to massive protests and demonstrations during the 
1960s (McAdam, 1981). To complement this account, keepers of the JFK and LBJ legacies add 
that these men were deeply affected by the movement’s events and forced to grapple with their 
moral convictions (Shogan, 2006; Stern, 1992). Kennedy staffers suggest he began to understand 
fully the situation in the South after watching events unfold on television. Johnson people talk 
about his stint with poverty and his time teaching poor Mexican children in Texas to suggest 
these experiences encouraged a deeper connection to all oppressed people, especially Black 
people during the 1960s (Caro, 2012). These descriptions imply that these actors experienced an 
emotional connection that led them to support change in their party’s position on racial issues. 
In the political science literature, the conventional account of the Democratic Party’s 
change comes from Carmines and Stimson (1983). They describe the Democratic Party’s 
development on racial issues using a theory of punctuated equilibrium, where issues evolve 
slowly then erupt to produce a rapid change. Elite actors are important in this account and they 
suggest the Democrats’ change on racial issues was largely a function of Congressional 
membership replacement (Carmines & Stimson, 1989: 63). A large cohort of liberals, newly 
elected to Congress in 1958 and 1964, supported federal intervention on civil rights issues and 
pushed for liberal legislation. The result was rapid progress on civil rights issues in the 1960s. 
Recent scholarship challenges several parts of the conventional story including the rate, 
timing, level and motivations for Democratic Party change. Scholars have questioned Carmines 
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& Stimson’s use of 1963 as a critical moment. They also question the notion that changes on 
civil rights issues originated at the congressional and presidential levels. Instead of happening at 
a critical moment in 1963, revisions claim the change was slow, beginning in the 1940s and 
continuing through the 1960s. They propose that shifts in the party position began at the state-
level, and show state party platforms becoming liberal sooner than national party platforms 
(Feinstein & Schickler, 2008). The recent scholarship also posits coalition management as 
motivation for party positions on race (Karol, 2009). According to this line of thinking, the labor 
and White liberal coalitions increased pressure on the Democratic Party at the local level to 
liberalize their positions on race (Feinstein, Pearson & Schickler, 2010). Republicans, on the 
other hand, became more conservative on racial issues in an effort to keep their business lobby 
happy (Karol, 2009). 
Although post-Issue Evolution accounts of party change go a long way in clarifying our 
understanding of an important moment in American politics, they neglect one of the most 
important factors in this story—demography. None of these works adequately connects changes 
in the population of American citizens to developments in the major party positions on race. 
They only include a brief mention of the Great Migration—seemingly out of obligation, rather 
than true acknowledgement of the migration’s critical importance.
14
 Understating the 
demographic transformations brought by the Great Migration is imperative to the story of party 
development on civil rights issues. These demographic issues warrant scholarly attention because 
they add nuance to our understanding of party position change on racial issues.  
This chapter proceeds in three parts. First, I review the relevant literature on change in 
American politics, dealing briefly with the realignment literature—which is usually how political 
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 Feinstein and Schickler (2008, pg. 20); Schickler, Pearson, and Feinstein (2010, pg. 682); Karol (2008, pg. 106) 
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scientists understand change in political parties. Next, I discuss other instances of party change 
caused by demographic factors. I will argue that parties are concerned with demographic changes 
that have the greatest consequence for their ability to win elections—expansion of the electorate. 
Finally, I show how the Great Migration fits as an instance of demographic factors driving a 
party to change —in this case expansion of the Black electorate. I will argue that understanding 
the Great Migration is necessary to explain Democratic Party change from 1948-1964. 
Realignment and Party Change in American Politics 
The concept of realignment has provided the primary vehicle for thinking and writing 
about change in American politics. Scholars have argued that realignment is critical, secular, 
some combination of those two, or none of these. In 1955, V.O. Key described a particular type 
of election,  
“in which voters are, at least from impressionistic evidence, unusually deeply 
concerned, in which the extent of electoral involvement is relatively quite high, 
and in which the decisive results of the voting reveal a sharp alteration of the pre-
existing cleavage within the electorate” (Key 1955: 4).  
In these “critical elections,” the electorate is knowledgeable about issues and participates 
in the political process at a heightened level. Key’s first conception of important elections has 
been useful in helping scholars organize and analyze elections. However, critical realignment has 
fallen out of favor as the best method for describing party change in the contemporary literature 
(Mayhew, 2002). 
The major problem with elaborations on critical realignment is the expectation that large-
scale change will occur approximately every 30 years. Burnham articulated this idea, which 
made sense at the time, in his 1970 work Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American 
Politics. According to his calculations, there had been three “realigning elections:” 1860, 1893 
and 1932 and the next would be occurring soon. However, his expectation for a dramatically 
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realigning election did not happen in the 1970s and many would argue it has not happened since 
the New Deal. If anything, change in contemporary American political parties has been an 
example of Key’s other conception of change—secular realignment. 
Key’s revised theory (1959) of coalitional change in political parties suggests change 
may occur gradually over a series of elections. He writes: 
“a secular shift in party attachment may be regarded as a movement of the 
members of a population category from party to party that extends over several 
presidential elections and appears to be independent of peculiar factors 
influencing the vote at individual elections” (Key 1959: 299). 
Under this idea, political parties’ interactions with coalitions drive change. E.E. 
Schattschneider (1960) similarly describes realignment in terms of coalitions and is concerned 
with the shifting interests of political parties. 
Petrocik (1981) digs deeper into the role of coalitions in realignment. He outlines three 
types of behavior as realignment: conversion, mobilization and demobilization (31). His theory 
includes two dimensions of mobilization: one where independent voters develop a new party 
preference (31) and another where levels of turnout increase (32). Scholars have applied the 
concept of mobilization to other groups in the electorate. For example, Andersen (1979) 
demonstrated that what looked like conversion of large numbers of people to the Democratic 
Party in the 1930s was actually mobilization of immigrants who had not participated in politics 
previously or did not have strong attachments to either political party. The Democrats registered 
these “non-immunized”
15
 individuals to vote, moved them to the polls and benefitted from this 
expansion of the electorate. 
Although conversion has been the most popular way to describe realignment of Black 
voters, Andersen’s theory of mobilization instead of conversion fits this case well. Conversion 
                                                 
15
 Non-immunized citizens are those without political attachments as a result of not having participated in politics in the past. 
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makes sense as an explanation for change in the party affiliation of Black voters because most of 
them participated in politics as Republicans for the first part of the 20
th
 century, and many of 
those Republicans “converted” to the Democratic Party during the New Deal. However, the 
Great Migration transported millions of non-immunized citizens to northern cities, and 
effectively expanded the electorate to include Black people for the first time since 
Reconstruction. Therefore, what looks like a wholesale defection by the Black electorate can be 
better understood as an introduction to politics by the Democratic Party for migrants. 
Expansion of the Electorate 
Earlier, I said that parties change in response to loss, and that how they change is 
constrained by a few factors: the size of a state, the likelihood that a state shares similar 
ideological positions and the likelihood that it can reshape its coalition to include a group that 
might share similar ideological dispositions. One of the ways a party can reshape its coalition to 
include like-minded groups is to capitalize on expansions of the electorate. Expansions occur in 
two ways: 1) by formal extension of the franchise or 2) by migration. In this section, I discuss 
other instances of party change caused by expansions of the electorate that have parallels to 
expansion caused by the Great Migration. 
Expansion Resulting From Formal Extension of the Franchise 
The 15
th
 Amendment  
The first large-scale expansion of the franchise came between the 1867 Reconstruction 
Act and passage of the 15th Amendment in 1870—when the constitution changed to give Black 
men the right to vote. Both parties clearly understood the potential benefits brought by the 
presence of these new voters. For a variety of reasons, Republicans in the South supported equal 
rights for Black people. In addition to their moral convictions, Republicans realized Black voters 
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would be helpful toward the goal of winning elections. For example, Republican Senator Charles 
Sumner of Massachusetts made the case for Black manhood suffrage by saying, “you need votes 
in Connecticut, do you not? There are three thousand fellow-citizens in that state ready at the call 
of Congress to take their place at the ballot box” (Keyssar, 2000: 94). 
Even some Democrats in the South, known as Cooperationists, conceded the benefits of 
winning Black support and changed their message in an attempt to court the votes of freedmen. 
They suggested freedmen and Southern Whites were “best friends,” and that they had been 
“generous masters.” They even went as far as telling Black men to support the Democratic Party 
because “we have grown up together; some of you have our blood in your veins” (Foner, 1988: 
292). However, Black voters would have no part of the Democratic appeal for their votes. They 
found it impossible to separate Cooperationists, in their roles as politicians, from their pasts as 
slave owners. On the topic of possible alliance with the Democrats, a freedman spoke up during 
a political rally for Democrat Herschel V. Johnson saying, “that old ship, the institution of 
slavery, is dead and I am glad of it. Shall I employ its captain or its manager to bear me through 
the ocean again?” (Foner, 1988: 293). 
The 19
th
 Amendment 
The next major formal expansion of the electorate came after the passage of the 19th 
Amendment to the Constitution, which granted woman suffrage in 1920. Leaders of both parties 
believed, rightly, that the addition of women voters would change politics and create an 
opportunity for parties to obtain a new bloc of voters. The parties prepared for this expansion of 
the electorate before 1920 by creating space for women to participate in the party organizations. 
The Democrats created a national women’s organization in 1917 and the Republicans followed 
suit the next year (Harvey, 1998:112). The parties gave women “nominally equal roles in the 
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party hierarchy” for the purpose of “efficient mobilization of women voters by women leaders” 
(Andersen, 1996: 81). 
Although a system of discrimination persisted for Black men in America, the 19
th
 
Amendment brought with it a limited increase in suffrage for Black women. Despite the fact both 
parties practiced racial segregation in their women’s organizations, they sought to reach a diverse 
population of women. The parties worked through Black churches and local community 
organizations to mobilize Black women. Democrats went further, also working with unions and 
the Catholic Church to organize and mobilize women laborers and immigrants (Harvey, 1998). 
Both parties changed their messages in pursuit of women voters. They addressed issues 
they believed would be most important to women, which were most frequently homemaking and 
child rearing. In one example of a direct appeal to women, President Warren G. Harding 
delivered a speech about civil rights and a maternity policy to five thousand women. He intended 
the speech to “attach them to the Republican Party” (Harvey, 1998:112). During the same 
campaign, Democrats recruited female campaign speakers and advertised the party’s positions on 
women’s issues in women’s magazines. 
Expansion Resulting from Migration 
In addition to formal extension of the franchise, migration can also lead to expansion of 
the electorate. Migration includes internal migration and immigration. I define internal migration 
as any movement of voters within the United States. Immigration, on the other hand, is the 
movement of people to America from another country. Immigration provides a source of new 
voters to the parties that would not normally be available except through the birth and coming of 
age of new citizens. From the arrival of the first immigrant groups, parties recognized the 
 27 
strategic political potential of these new Americans and worked to encourage their 
participation—or to limit it—based on the party’s perceived benefits. 
Immigrants 
Scholars frequently turn to rainbow theory to explain parties’ interactions with and 
attempts to mobilize immigrants (Dahl, 1961; Merton, 1968). Rainbow theory argues that parties 
work to mobilize various groups of ethnic minorities to build a winning coalition. The party 
organizations rewarded groups by giving them patronage or supporting their bids for elected 
office. In a critique of rainbow theory, Erie (1988) contrasts this view. He suggests that party 
machines, which worked to register and mobilize voters in the past, had deteriorated by the 20
th
 
century. Parties did not mobilize voters because they had few resources and mobilizing new 
groups would require them to have, and expend, benefits that did not exist. Further, Erie says 
machines often worked to suppress votes as a way to maintain their dominance among their 
existing base. 
Rainbow theory is a helpful lens through which to view the parties’ interaction with 
Black voters. In the analyses of Dahl, Merton and Erie, the reward to loyal voters is patronage. I 
extend the idea of party rewards and resources to include a party’s ability to give policy (or a 
change in its position) as a reward to loyal groups of voters. I make the case that the national 
Democratic Party behaved as a machine party in the post-war era because it rewarded loyal 
and/or important groups of voters with liberal policies instead of giving them material benefits. 
The Great Migration as Expansion of the Electorate Through Migration 
Scholars acknowledge Black voters as an important bloc in the Democratic coalition. 
They also acknowledge the Great Migration, but they do not deal with its role in depth. When 
people do write about the Great Migration, they do not describe it as a case of electorate 
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expansion or group mobilization. Furthermore, political scientists who are writing about 
expansion of the electorate and group mobilizations rarely include a discussion of the Great 
Migration.  
This migration is unique because it engages both types of franchise expansion: expansion 
based on formal requirements and expansion caused by migration. Unlike other groups of 
movers in American history, migrants already had a formal right to vote. However, they could 
not exercise their rights. White primaries, Grandfather clauses, violence and a host of other 
tactics stood between Black voters and ballot boxes. Second, their movement was different from 
other frequently discussed migrations. Unlike the European immigrants, participants in the Great 
Migration moved within their home country. Also unlike other instances of internal migration in 
the United States—namely the migration to the Western territories—migrants were moving 
between jurisdictions that had equal authority. In other words, they were not leaving territories to 
go to states or leaving states to go to territories; they moved between equal sub-national 
jurisdictions. “The move was more than simple migration and change in folkways for Blacks, it 
was a move, almost literally, from no voting to voting” (Brooks, 1974: 17). 
Conclusion 
It is obvious that the Great Migration had a tremendous impact on American Politics. 
However, the literature in the field does not reflect this fact. Although our understanding of 
Democratic Party change has evolved tremendously, we could improve it by unpacking the 
significance of the Great Migration as a driver of party change. In what follows, I seek to fill this 
void by adding a discussion of demographic change to the recent scholarship on Democratic 
Party development on civil rights issues during the post-war era.  
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 Chapter Two: The National Democratic Situation, 1932-1964 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the political context for the Democratic Party’s 
position change during in the post-war era. I argue the Democrats’ compromised electoral 
position in the late 1940s and 1950s, coupled with growth of the Black population through the 
Great Migration, led them to change their political positions on government involvement in civil 
rights issues from supporting states’ rights to one of support for federal intervention on behalf of 
Black people. My analysis examines the downward trends of the Democratic Party in the period 
leading up to the party’s position change. 
Figure 2.1: Distribution of the Popular Vote, by Percentage 1900-1960  
Source: Compiled by the author, Stonecash dataset
16
 
 
This chapter has three parts. First, I describe and analyze the electoral situation of the 
Democratic Party’s presidential candidates from 1900-1960 (see figure 2, above). Further, I 
focus on 1932-1956 to provide context for my larger argument that the Democratic Party needed 
Black voters in their coalition as a part of their EC strategy for the post-war period. Second, I call 
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into question the dominance of the New Deal coalition by describing increasingly competitive 
elections from 1944-1956. My analysis demonstrates that the Democrats experienced losses and 
narrow margins of victory at the presidential and congressional levels. I argue that the party’s 
sustained electoral uncertainty contributed to their willingness to change policy positions on civil 
rights during this period. Third, I consider the constraints posed by the Democratic Party’s need 
to win the EC. I find that Democrats faced special challenges in the states with the highest EC 
delegations, and that where the Democrats did win, they won by small margins. These narrow 
victories left them feeling the pressure to fortify their electoral chances outside the South, 
especially in large EC states, where they stood to gain the most. 
How do States Become Important? 
Because candidates’ foremost goal is winning, parties devise strategies to make the EC 
rules work in their favor. Therefore, we should expect that presidential candidates and political 
parties would be constrained by their desire to reach the required majority in the EC. 
 
 In this chapter, I argue that states that met two criteria were most important to the 
Democratic Party from 1932-1960. Specifically, states with large EC vote shares and states 
where the vote margin in the last election was +/- five points. First, candidates consider the 
overall size of the EC vote of a state. Because the goal is to achieve majority, states with many 
States  
in  
Play 
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EC  
States 
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States 
Figure 2.2: How States Become Important 
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EC votes become more important than states with few EC votes. Second, candidates consider 
their likelihood of winning a state. They base decisions about a state’s viability on data collected 
from past electoral contests, feedback from local party officials, media coverage and polling 
data. The greatest potential to change the electoral situation comes from states with large EC 
numbers and small margins of victory, where candidates stand a chance to win. 
Democratic Electoral College Vote 
As previously stated, I argue that large EC states
17
 were more important to the 
Democratic Party during the period of interest than other states. Based on this logic, the seven 
states—New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, California, Texas and Michigan—meet this 
criterion from 1932-1960. Together, these states controlled approximately 38 percent
18
 of the 
nation’s EC votes during the period of interest. They controlled between 76-77 percent
19
 of the 
EC majority/votes needed to win. I base my analysis of party strategy on the idea that candidates 
who secure most of these large states would only need the EC votes of a few other states to 
achieve majority. 
Table 2.1: Electoral College votes in Large EC States, 1932-1956 
  1932 1936 1940 1944 1948 1952 1956 
  D R D R D R D R D R D R D R 
CA 47 0 47 0 22 0 25 0 25 0 0 32 0 32 
IL 0 36 36 0 0 29 0 28 28 0 0 27 0 27 
MI 29 0 29 0 0 19 19 0 0 19 0 20 0 20 
NY 26 0 26 0 47 0 47 0 0 47 0 45 0 45 
OH 22 0 22 0 26 0 0 25 25 0 0 25 0 25 
PA 23 0 23 0 36 0 35 0 0 35 0 32 0 32 
TX 19 0 19 0 0 23 23 0 23 0 0 24 0 24 
Total: 166 36 202 0 131 71 149 53 101 101 0 205 0 205 
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 Where large is defined as 19 votes or more. 
18
 202 votes from 1932-1948 and 205 votes from 1952-1960 
19
 76.08 percent from 1936-149; 77.21 percent from 1952-1952; 76.35 in 1960 
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In investigating the Democratic Party electoral position in these states, I find the party did 
well during the 1932-1944 campaigns but faced increasingly competitive odds in the EC 
thereafter. By 1948, Republicans had the same number of EC votes in high EC states as 
Democrats. The Democratic Party was unable to earn any EC votes in large EC states during the 
elections of 1952 and 1956. Connecting these total losses back to my original argument—that 
parties change their positions in response to electoral losses—it should follow that the 
Democratic Party sought to change its strategy to win voters in these states for the elections of 
the 1960s.  See Table 2.1, above. 
The Development of the Democratic Party from 1932-1956 
Franklin D. Roosevelt- 1932 
The Republican Party experienced success for 12 years before the New Deal during a 
time of economic prosperity in America. However, when the Great Depression was most harsh in 
the early 1930s, congressional elections revealed the first signs of an impending Democratic 
victory in the next presidential election (Brewer & Stonecash, 2008). The American electorate 
voted the Republican Party out of the White House in 1932 and FDR became President with 63 
percent of the popular vote and 472 votes in the EC. 
FDR won in 44 states. He carried six of the seven large EC states—all except 
Pennsylvania, where he lost by less than three points. There were six states-in-play during this 
election—DE, CT, NH, NJ, OH and MA. Of these, three (CT, NH and DE) were lost by small 
margins. FDR’s greatest margins of victory were in the South. He won Alabama, Texas, 
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina and Arkansas with 70 percent or more of the 
 33 
popular vote.
20
 In other parts of the South, FDR won by margins that were decisive but not as 
large—FL 49.5%; NC, 40.6%; VA, 38.4%; TN, 34.%; MD, 25.5%; KY, 18.4%.
21
 
1936 
By the 1936 campaign, the New Deal was in full swing, and motivated by outside forces, 
FDR moved Left on issues (Brewer & Stonecash, 2009: 74).
22
 Scholars attribute the increase in 
support for the New Deal to the success of the federal government’s intervention, which 
stimulated the economy (Luechtenburg, 2006). Consequently, FDR increased his share of the 
popular vote for 1936 to 65 percent and won 523 of 531 EC votes. The President only lost in two 
states, repeating the loss of Maine and picking up a new loss in Vermont. However, FDR was 
able to bring New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Nebraska and Connecticut into the 
Democratic column after having lost them in the previous election. Like 1932, the most decisive 
victories were in the South.  
1940 
The strength of the New Deal is well documented among political scientists and 
historians. However, the electoral challenges faced by the New Deal coalition after its high point 
in 1936 are less frequently discussed. The 1940 election was the beginning of a downward trend 
in Democratic Party fortunes that lasted throughout the 1940s. This decline eventually led to 
electoral losses in the 1950s and created tremendous uncertainty for the 1960s. Roosevelt’s 
popular vote majority declined for the first time, by six points to 59 percent, in the 1940 election. 
Roosevelt’s share of the EC vote declined from 523 votes in the previous election to 449. The 
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 He also won 70 percent of the vote in Wyoming. 
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 Places where the margin was more than five but ten or less: Michigan, 8%; West Virginia, 10%; Kansas, 9.5%. 
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 1) Supreme Court invalidation of his New Deal policies, 2) differences of opinion with the business community and 3) the 
influence of other political actors (Coughlin, Long and Townsend).  
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1940 election was also the first time, between 1935-1960, the Republican Party earned more of 
the popular vote in any region than the Democrats, with 52 percent of the vote in the Midwest. 
Although the popular vote margin in the Midwest did not translate into EC success for the 
Republicans in 1940, it was the beginning of an extremely competitive trend in the midwestern 
states. 
1944 
The Democratic Party was increasingly concerned about its vice presidential candidate 
because the sitting Vice President, Henry Wallace lacked support among party regulars during 
the previous campaign (Milkis, 1993). There was also concern about FDR’s declining health. 
Though FDR’s health improved before the national convention, leaders of the Democratic Party 
understood that the 1944 vice presidential candidate stood a real chance of becoming President 
of the United States of America. Thus, Roosevelt and the national party operatives settled on 
Harry S. Truman “a moderate from a border state,” as the President’s running mate (Milkis, 
1992: 150). 
Although the Roosevelt/Truman ticket experienced declining shares of the popular vote 
in all regions—they were able to win the election in 1944 with 57 percent of the popular vote. 
Roosevelt’s share of the EC vote also dropped from 449 to 435 votes. A new Republican 
candidate, Thomas Dewey, got 41 percent of the popular vote and 96 EC votes. For the second 
election in a row, the GOP won a majority of the popular vote in the Midwest. 
Harry S. Truman- 1948 
In April of 1945, FDR died at his retreat in Warm Springs, Georgia and Harry S. Truman 
became the President of the United States through an involuntary act of constitutional law. 
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Truman served nearly an entire term of office because FDR’s term started only three months 
earlier in January of 1945. After President Roosevelt’s death, the Democrats worked to balance 
the diverse interests of the New Deal coalition and mourn the death of one of the most popular 
presidents in U.S. history. 
Between his succession and the election of 1948, Truman and his advisors worked to 
figure out how he could secure the presidency in his own right (Sitkoff, 1971). In a strategy 
designed to expand his coalition, Truman’s advisers suggested he appeal to Black voters because 
they believed Southern voters would be loyal to the Democratic Party regardless of changes in its 
positions. Further, they realized they needed support from other parts of the country to win the 
presidency. In response to this advice, Truman took liberal positions on issues related to race (I 
discuss these issues at length in chapter 5). However, contrary to his advisors hopes, Truman’s 
posturing made Democrats in the South furious. Also problematic was the fact two third-party 
candidates ran against him, further stressing his need to get votes outside of the South.  
By November of 1948, it seemed certain that the Democrats would lose. However, Harry 
Truman won the presidency by a plurality of 48 percent, the lowest popular vote percentage 
since the Democrats took office in 1932. Again, the Democrats’ share of the EC dropped again 
from 439 to 304 of the available 531 EC votes, with Republicans earning 189 votes and 
Dixiecrat Strom Thurmond earning 38. Republicans won 41 percent of the popular vote and 
third-party candidates won 10 percent of the popular vote. 
There were 20 states in play during the election of 1948, which further demonstrates that 
Truman barely won the election. Many of the close states were in the Midwest and West. 
Maryland and Delaware departed from the rest of the South, which remained Democratic in its 
behavior and voted for the GOP. 
 36 
Aldai Stevenson- 1952 & 1956 
By 1952, it was clear that Harry Truman did not have enough support in the party to win 
re-nomination (Leuchtenburg, 2006). It was also clear that Truman favored Aldai Stevenson for 
the Democratic nomination.
23
 Truman recruited the Illinois governor to run, believing he had the 
best shot at retaining the presidency for the Democratic Party. As the President’s top pick, 
Stevenson inherited some of South’s distain of Truman. Southern Democratic leaders 
encouraged Democrats to vote against their party through a “Democrats for Eisenhower” 
movement (Leuchtenburg, 2006: 221). 
Moderate Republicanism also presented challenges for the Democratic Party by the 
1950s (Ware, 2006: 187). In 1952 and 1956, Democratic Party candidate Adlai Stevenson lost to 
Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower. The 1952 loss was the Democrat’s first presidential 
campaign loss in 20 years. Democrats’ share of the popular vote continued falling from previous 
years down to 44 percent. On the other hand, the GOP’s share of the popular vote increased to 55 
percent. In the EC, Democrats earned only 92 votes compared to the Republicans’ 439 votes. 
Democrats experienced real competition in the South when Eisenhower won Florida, Tennessee, 
Texas and Virginia (Black & Black, 2002). 
The Democratic Party experienced loss again in 1956, despite changing the vice 
presidential candidate. Their share of the popular vote decreased further to 42 percent, the lowest 
point since 1924, while the Republicans maintained 55 percent of the popular vote. The 
Democrats earned 77 votes in the EC, and Republicans increased their vote share from the 
previous year to 454 EC votes. 
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 Leviero, A. (1952, Jul 23). Truman reported Stevenson backer. New York Times (1923-Current File). Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/112359599?accountid=14214 . 
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Regional Popular Vote Analysis 
Based on the decline in their position, Democrats should have been seeking new coalition 
partners for the 1960 and 1964 presidential elections. In the previous section, I considered the 
national position of the Democratic Party to show that their position was steadily deteriorating. 
In this section, I consider election returns at the regional level to see whether there was a decline 
across the nation or whether Democrats were struggling in a particular region, which led to their 
national problems. Figure 2.3 (below) illustrates the downward trend in Democratic popular vote 
percentages during the period of interest, by region. At the beginning of the period, Democrats 
drew most of their strength from the South. By the end of the period, most Democratic support 
came from the North. Declining Democratic support helped the Party know that they needed to 
look to places other than the South as the foundation of their support. 
Figure 2.3: Democratic Vote Percentage, by Region 1932-1956  
Source: Complied by Author from Stonecash dataset
24
 
 
As I mentioned previously, the Democrats reached their lowest level of support in all 
regions during the 1948 election. The candidacies of Henry Wallace on the Left and Strom 
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Thurmond on the Right siphoned votes from both the liberal and Southern conservative wings of 
the party. The impact of Wallace’s campaign was minimal, but Thurmond’s campaign strongly 
affected the Democratic Party by taking more than 1.1 million popular votes and 39 EC votes. 
In the North, Democrats began the period just below 50 percent in 1932 and were able to 
increase their popular vote percentages until the 1940 campaign. After 1940, the Democratic 
share of the popular vote in the North decreased until it reached a low of 37 percent in 1956. By 
1940, Democrats lost their footing in the Midwest and the Republican Party was able to win a 
majority of the popular vote for the 1940 and 1944 elections. The Democrats were able to regain 
their position in the region by the 1948 election when they won the popular vote by less than one 
percentage point. However, the Democratic Party experienced the greatest decline in popular 
vote percentages in the Western region. After the New Deal apex of 1936, the Democratic share 
of the popular vote in that region decreased steadily from a high of 68 percent in 1936 to a low of 
42 percent in 1956. 
Regional EC Vote Analysis 
By 1940, the party experienced a drop in the percentage of EC votes earned in each 
region, but the decline began in the Midwest earlier than in other regions—starting in 1936. The 
Midwestern decline lasted through 1944 and the Democrats gained a larger percentage of the EC 
vote in that region during the 1948 campaign. The West also showed a decline in the percentage 
of EC votes won by the Democrats starting in 1940, although the party recovered in that region 
for the next election. Democrats maintained a steady percentage of the EC vote in the West 
through 1948. By 1952, the Democratic percentage of the EC vote in all states dropped 
dramatically, resulting in a Democratic loss. The Democrats did not recover from their losses in 
the EC for the 1956 election. See Figure 2.4, below. 
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Figure 2.4: Democratic Electoral College Votes, by Region 1932-1956  
Source: Compiled by Author from Stonecash dataset
25
 
 
Congressional Analysis 
Yet, another way to consider the electoral situation of the Democratic Party during the 
period of interest is through the party’s performance in Congress. Overall, the Democrats were 
successful in the House of Representatives during the period of interest. They controlled the 
chamber for all but two congresses: the 80
th
 from 1947-1949 and the 83
rd
 from 1953-1955. 
The Democrats maintained a supermajority of support in Southern states from 1932-
1956. Outside the South, most of the Democratic support in the House came from the West 
where the party maintained a majority for most of the period. The situation was more 
complicated in the North and Midwest. In the North, Democrats earned less than a majority of 
votes between 1938 and 1956. The situation was worse in the Midwest where the Democratic 
Party did not attain a majority of votes in the House at any time during the period of interest. 
Looking Forward to 1960 
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By the time of the 1960 election, the ability of the Democratic Party to win the 
presidential election was highly uncertain. There was some optimism, based on the success of the 
congressional Democratic Party during the 1958 campaign and an economic downturn in 1958 
also provided some hope the party might be able to regain the presidency. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I established that the Democratic Party faced a precarious electoral 
situation at the presidential level from 1932 through 1956. I argue that this uncertainty led the 
party to change its positions on issues to attract voters in states in play that had large EC vote 
counts. Further, I asserted that Democrats would work especially hard to court voters in large 
urban areas of states with high EC counts. In the next chapter, I describe the movement of Black 
people from Southern rural areas to Northern and Midwestern urban areas. I will argue that their 
migration to these places made them attractive coalition partners and was a necessary condition 
for the Democratic Party’s development of racial positions during the post-war era.  
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 Chapter Three: The Great Migration 
The Great Migration—movement of millions of Black people from the South to the 
North—is one of the most important events of American history. The mass exodus of Black 
people out of the South would eventually change the American landscape and set into motion 
one of the most profound developments in recent American history, the Civil Rights Movement. 
Wilkerson (2010) aptly puts this migration into context writing “this mass relocation would 
come to dwarf the California Gold Rush of the 1850s with its one hundred thousand participants 
and the Dust Bowl migration of some three hundred thousand people from Oklahoma and 
Arkansas to California in the 1930s” (p. 10).  
It is important to consider the Great Migration because it affected politicians’ electoral 
calculus and also because it extended benefits to the movers. Migrants left a region where it was 
often difficult to vote and settled in places where they faced fewer overt challenges to their 
participation. The Democratic Party was aware of the changes in Northern constituencies. 
Mirroring Party behavior at the local level in the North, the national Democratic Party 
recognized the importance of Black voters and (changed their behavior) to win Black votes. 
In the previous chapter, I established that Democrats faced competitive elections and that 
conditions were ripe for them to seek new coalition partners. In this chapter, I describe the details 
of the migration. I discuss: 1) when and how the migration occurred, 2) the factors that 
stimulated migration, 3) the type of person who was most likely to participate in migration and 
4) the number of people who moved and how their movement changed the composition of states. 
Waves of Migration 
Scholars debate the exact start and end of the Great Migration. However, most agree that 
the Great Migration occurred in two waves, as prompted by World Wars and changes in the 
 42 
agricultural economy (Gregory, 2005; Johnson and Campbell, 1981; Scott, 1920; Spear, 1967). 
The first wave occurred from about 1915 until 1920, and the second was from 1940-1965.  
During the first wave of migration, boll weevil ravaged Southern farms, destroying crops 
and making it harder for farmers to recover from the losses caused by market forces. In 1915, 
Northern industrial labor agents entered the state of Florida looking for individuals who were 
willing to relocate to Pennsylvania for work (Scott, 1920: 38; Johnson & Campbell: 72). Once it 
became clear to Black Southerners that opportunities for work were available outside the South, 
they started moving on their own and the use of labor agents decreased. Eventually, the Great 
Depression slowed the migration to a virtual halt as opportunities for work disappeared. 
The second wave began in 1941 at the start of America’s involvement in World War II 
and lasted through the 1960s. Scholars estimate that 6.5 million Black people left the South 
during the migration with five million of them leaving after 1940 (Lemann, 1991).  
It would be wrong to suggest that one of these migrations was more important because 
they affected the Black community and the nation in different ways. Although sociologists and 
historians tend to focus on the first wave of migration, the second wave is equally important and 
warrants consideration. I have chosen to focus on the second wave because a larger number of 
people left the South during that time. 
The second wave of the Great Migration is important to the story of change in the 
Democratic Party because it coincides with the beginning of the long civil rights movement 
(Hall, 2005: 1240). Politically, migrants would have been an increasingly important 
consideration of the Democratic Party because of their movement to very populous cities and 
states, because of their large numbers and because Black people who were already in the North 
were already beginning to align with the Democratic Party. 
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Changing Populations in the North 
From the nation’s founding through the mid-twentieth century, most of the Black people 
in America resided in the South. However, the Black population moved throughout the nation 
rapidly from World War II onward. Whereas 68 percent of America’s Black population resided 
in the South in 1950, only 53 percent was living in the South by 1970. 
Over the course of the 20
th
 century, the number of Black people living outside the South 
increased dramatically in the large, industrial cities and states. The growth in the percentage of 
Black voters in Northern states provides insight into the growing political power of the Black 
community. Table 3.1 below indicates the change in percentage of Black voters as a portion of 
the total electorate, which ranges from an increase of three percent on the low end in 
Pennsylvania to an increase of seven percent in New York. 
 
Table 3.1: Increase in Percentage of Black Voters in Five States, 1930-1970  
Source: Detailed Characteristics of the Population. Age by race and sex, 1900-1970. US Census, 1930-1970 
 
1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 
California 1.4% 1.8% 4.3% 5.1% 6.7% 
Illinois 4.7% 4.9% 7.3% 9.2% 11.0% 
Michigan 3.9% 4.1% 7.1% 8.6% 10.2% 
New York 3.5% 4.3% 6.1% 8.0% 10.6% 
Pennsylvania 4.7% 4.7% 5.9% 7.0% 7.7% 
 
The proportion of Black people living in the South decreased dramatically over time. At 
the beginning of the second wave in 1940, approximately 24 percent of the Southern population 
was Black but that number decreased to 19 percent by the end of the second wave in 1970 
(Johnson & Campbell, 1981: 125 & 154). The distribution of Black people in the nation shows a 
similar pattern.  
Why Migrate? 
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Black people migrated for a variety of reasons. Economic conditions throughout the 
nation had an important effect on decisions to move (Holley, 2000; Marks, 1989; Scott, 1920). 
The most revolutionary change in the production of cotton since the cotton gin, the mechanical 
cotton picker, all but eliminated the need for human labor in the industry in the 1940s. The result 
was a region that no longer needed Black labor and was hostile toward Black people. Even 
without developments in agricultural technology, Black laborers in the South were considering 
ways to attain higher wages and better standards of living. “Most of the migrants were not 
pushed out by mechanical cotton pickers; they were pulled out in a search for better economic 
opportunities… they were trying to escape the hard work and low pay associated with Southern 
cotton fields” (Holley, 2003: 283). 
Beyond the economic differences between regions, there were the social, educational and 
political benefits of living outside the South. In Northern metropolitan areas, Black people could 
indulge in the luxuries of middle class American life. Although there were some challenges and 
limits to their assimilation outside Black neighborhoods, within their local communities they 
could often purchase homes and join civic organizations. They could be a part of substantially 
sized, upwardly mobile communities of similar individuals—which was different from any type 
of community they might find in the South, even in the urban areas (Johnson and Campbell, 
1981: 145). Northern life also meant educational opportunities for the children of migrants. By 
contrast, many southern schools lacked resources and maintained abbreviated school calendars 
so children could work in the fields (Johnson and Campbell, 1981: 109).  
Some of the reasons for migration were political—having to do with their desire to 
exercise the full rights of American citizenship (Woodson, 1970). Another important aspect of 
Northern life was the ability to participate in the political process. As opposed to their situation 
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in the South where participation in politics was difficult, in many instances migrants in the North 
were registered to vote and participated in larger percentages than their white neighbors. The 
Great Migration is the only instance in American history where a group of American citizens had 
to leave their homes in one region before they could meaningfully participate in the political 
process.  
Furthermore, many of the reasons they moved were moral—having to do with their sense 
of fairness, justice and the way they deserved to be treated (Painter; 1977; Wilkerson, 2010). 
Above all else, migrants hoped their move would bring them a greater degree of freedom and 
absence of violence and discrimination in their everyday lives (Marks, 1989).
26
  
Where Did They Migrate? 
For most migrants, the first stop in the journey northward was an urban area in the South. 
Cities like Memphis, Birmingham, Jacksonville and Atlanta were home to many of the migrants 
immediately after they left their farming communities (Marks, 1989: 3; Gregory, 2005). 
Although the economic opportunities presented by urban areas of the South were better than 
those of farm life, they could not compare to the promises of the North. Migrants who chose to 
go further north moved up from their Southern starting points in parallel streams (Ciment; 2007; 
Gregory, 2005; Johnson & Campbell, 1991; Scott, 1920). See figure 3.1, below. 
Those leaving Florida, Georgia and the Carolinas went to states along the mid-Atlantic 
and eastern coast. Many settled in Pennsylvania (Philadelphia and Pittsburgh), New York (New 
York City and Buffalo) and New Jersey (Newark, Paterson and Jersey City). Those migrants 
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 Although understanding what drove Black people to leave the South is important, coming to consensus on the scholarly debate 
about push/pull factors is of secondary concern to this work. Most important for the context of this work is that Black people did 
decide to leave the South in large numbers and their decision had a profound impact on the political environment both locally and 
nationally.  
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leaving parts of the South that were further inland migrated to cities that were also further inland. 
The residents of Mississippi, Alabama and Tennessee often went to Illinois (Chicago and East St. 
Louis), Missouri (St. Louis), Ohio (Cleveland) and Michigan (Detroit). Migrants who lived in 
Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas and Arkansas were most likely to relocate to California (Los 
Angeles, Oakland and Richmond) (Johnson & Campbell, 1981: 116; Scott, 1920: 55; Gregory, 
2009). 
Figure 3.1: Streams of Movement in the Great Migration 
Source: Ciment (2007) Atlas of African American History. Checkmark Books. 
 
 
Who Migrated? 
The type of people who participated in the migration is important because it impacted the 
composition of the electorate. Overall, there were more male migrants than females (Marks, 
1989: 36). However, women were over-represented in the population of migrants who moved to 
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the Northeast and more women moved during the second wave than did during the first (Johnson 
& Campbell, 1981; Gregory, 2009).
27
  
The average age of the migrants was 20-25 during the second wave of migration. 
Therefore, most would have been newly eligible to vote at the time of their move. Although 
many young people left the South in search of work and liberty, most likely to move was the so-
called talented tenth—which included the college educated or highly skilled segment of the 
Black population (Woodson, 1970: 147).
28
 The talented tenth included young people who moved 
to attend private northern colleges and chose not to return or they attended college in the South 
and decided to relocate to the North when they graduated. Soldiers returning from war migrated 
in a similar pattern. After military service, many who were born in the South found it difficult to 
return to their inferior “place” in the Southern social system and chose to live in the North. Based 
on their socio-economic status, this talented-tenth portion of the population would have been 
most likely to register and turnout to vote. 
How Did They Migrate? 
Leaderless Movement 
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 I think it is important to note that women actively supported migration, even when they could not move, by taking jobs as 
domestic workers to support their families while male migrants were away. They also frequently took responsibility for younger 
members of their extended families when both parents decided to move and send for children later (see: Marks, page 45. See 
also: Hine, D. C. (1991) “Black Migration to the Urban Midwest: The Gender Dimension, 1915-1945” in ed., Joe William Trotter 
Jr., The Great Migration in Historical Perspective: New Dimensions of Race, Class, and Gender (pp. 127-146) Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press 
28
 The idea of the talented tenth originated with Henry Lyman Morehouse, founder of Morehouse College, who thought liberal 
arts education should be available for “exceptional” Black people. He posited that for every ten Black people, there will be one 
among them who is exceptional and deserving of a liberal arts education. In his own words “The tenth man, with superior natural 
endowments, symmetrically trained and highly developed, may become a mightier influence, a greater inspiration to others than 
all the other nine, or nine times nine like them.” (for more on Morehouse see: Higginbotham, Evelyn Brooks (1994) Righteous 
Discontent: The Women’s Movement in the Black Baptist Church, 1880 – 1920. Harvard University Press. Cambridge. 
W.E.B. Dubois made the idea of the talented tenth popular in an essay where he suggests that the race will be “saved by its 
exceptional men.” From the time of Dubois’ writing until now, many in the Black community have referred to other Black 
Americans who are of the professional class as the talented tenth.  
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Scholars attribute the leadership of the initial northbound movements of Black people to 
Harriett Tubman and the abolitionists of the Underground Railroad, Henry Adams of Louisiana, 
and Benjamin “Pap” Singleton of Tennessee. However, for the rest of the Great Migration there 
was no authoritative source in the community working to encourage migrants to leave the South; 
it was a leaderless movement (Painter, 1977; Wilkerson, 2010). Migration was mostly an 
individual decision, made by a young person who decided to try making it on her/his own in the 
North or made by a husband and wife who decided one of them would go North and send for the 
rest of the family when possible (Scott 1920; Marks 1989). Various methods of communication 
worked together to drive northward migration. 
Word of Mouth 
Discussions within Southern communities, communication with friends in the North and 
encouragement from the Black press helped stimulate migration. News from the North, through 
letters from those who were already gone, recruitment ads from employers, and organizations 
seeking to help migrants transition, served as the best advertisement for life in the region. 
Migrants described how they were able to find work, what their living conditions were like and 
how Northerners treated them (Marks, 1989: 25; Scott, 1920; 34). Churches, civic organization 
meetings, barbershops and beauty salons in the South were hotbeds of conversation and 
discussion about whether it was a good idea to go North. Sometimes there was division on the 
issue. Some advocated staying in the South near family and maintaining the Black community, 
while others argued that migration was necessary for progress of the race (Scott, 1920; Goodwin, 
1990).  
Black Press 
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The Black press also played a powerful role in encouraging migration. The Chicago 
Defender, which was read throughout Black America—especially in the South—was most 
important; the paper was often a very aggressive advocate for migration. For example, in 1917, 
The Defender called for a “Great Northern Drive” to occur on May 15, 1917 and encouraged 
those who were considering a move to go North on that date (Scott, 1920). The Defender was 
also a source of information for potential migrants. People interested in moving to the North 
wrote to The Defender for various types of information about where they might be able to work 
or live. An example of a typical letter from a migrant is included below: 
Dear Sir: In reading a copy of The Chicago Defender…if I get in touch with you, 
you would assist me in getting employment. I am not employed. I [live on] the 
Florida East coast. R. R. Service [or] road way department[…]anything in 
working line myself [and] friends would be more than glad to do so and would 
highly appreciate it the very best we can advise where we can get work to do, 
fairly good wages. [A]lso is it possible that we could get transportation to the 
destination. We are working men with families. Please answer at once. I am your 
esteem. We are not particular about the electric lights and all I want is fairly good 
wages and steady work. Jacksonville, Florida, 4-25-17 (Goodwin, 1990: 13) 
What Happened When They Arrived? 
In spite of all the stress they encountered through their moves from South to North, 
migrants found time to be concerned about politics. Along with having a job, political 
involvement and voter registration were hallmarks of success in the North. Black voter 
registration and turnout levels matched the White population and, as previously mentioned, in 
some instances, were even greater (Wilson, 1960: 39; see also: Gosnell, 1967 and Moon, 1948). 
Although voter registration was a top priority for many, getting involved with the 
political process was a challenge for some. Difficulty finding a stable residence sometimes made 
it hard for migrants to meet eligibility requirements for registration. They were not included in 
the process in places that did not have well-organized local party systems. On the other hand, 
migrants in cities with party machines were able to register and participate with an ease unknown 
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to them in the South. In Chicago, for example, Democrats met registrants at train stations or paid 
visits to their homes shortly after they resettled (Marks, 1989; Wilkerson, 2010).  
[Democrats] went door-to-door to talk up the New Deal and register people. They asked 
about kids and jobs and convinced [migrants] that the Democrats in the North were 
different from those in the South. They printed up party slates and passed out palm 
cards—political crib notes that would fit in the palm of the hand—so people would know 
who to vote for when they got inside the booth (Wilkerson, 2010: 304). 
 
In addition to shaping their participation, a migrant’s choice of residence also shaped 
their first party affiliation. Migrants usually aligned with dominant political machines in the 
cities. They participated as Democrats in cities with a strong Democratic presence, like New 
York and Chicago, and they participated as Republicans in places like Philadelphia where the 
Republican Party was dominant. Although migrants’ standing as U.S. citizens and tendencies to 
vote as a bloc could be beneficial to local political organizations, their desire to participate was 
met with varying levels of resistance that ranged from ignoring the new residents to diminishing 
their influence through vote busting schemes (Erie, 1990).
29
 
The next chapter focuses on the political impact of Black voters in five cities. I will argue 
that Black voters were important at the local level and that their importance eventually translated 
to the national level.  
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 Citizenship was helpful to separate migrants from immigrants, who had to gain citizenship before they could participate in 
politics. 
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 Chapter Four: Local Balance of Power, 1948-1962 
Scholars often take a macro/national approach when analyzing the role of Black voters in 
the Democratic Party. However, before this influence occurred at the national level, they had a 
strong impact on their local political environments.  
As discussed previously, Southern migrants were potentially important to the political 
parties because they settled in states whose population totals and locations had the potential to 
decide the outcome of the EC. When the rest of the population is divided in its support for a 
candidate, Black voters tendency to vote as a bloc, and willingness to vote for either political 
party made them the BOP in many elections. In other words, Black voters were the swing vote in 
many local and state elections.  
This new position as the BOP in elections made them an important consideration of both 
parties. They became increasingly important as migration multiplied their numbers in urban 
areas of the North, and increased the likelihood they would be elected to public office. Between 
their strength in numbers and increasing election to office, Black voters were able to influence 
sub-national politicians—especially Democrats—to take liberal positions on civil rights before 
partisans at the national level. 
My argument in this chapter is that local Democratic Party organizations changed their 
positions on civil rights issues in response to the growth of the Black population in the North. As 
the party sought to strengthen its electoral standing, they worked to court, register and mobilize 
Black voters by taking positions that would be attractive to this newly emerging bloc. In other 
words, the Democrats’ shift in position on civil rights issues was as much a reaction to the 
changing demographic context of post-war America as it was a reaction to changes in political 
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attitudes, the double V campaign
30
, or pressure from the civil rights movement. Ultimately, the 
importance of Black voters at the local level drove efforts to make migrants a part of the national 
Democratic Party coalition. 
The chapter proceeds in three parts. First, I discuss the local demographic impact of the 
Great Migration through a BOP argument and demonstrate the numerical importance of the 
BVAP. I show that Black voters were able to affect the outcome of some key local elections 
from 1946-1962.31 Second, I describe migrant interactions with local parties in five cities: 
Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, New York and Philadelphia. These cities are important to my 
work because they were home to a large number of migrants during the period of interest. 
Further, the Democratic Party strategy of accumulating EC votes in big states heightened the 
importance of these cities in national politics. I describe the characteristics of each city in Table 
3.1, below. 
Table 4.1- Governmental and Political Structures in Five Cities 
 
Third, I show the growing strength of the Black electorate by discussing their increasing 
involvement in the parties through their election to office and participation in local party 
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 The double V campaign was an effort by Black service members who argued they were fighting for victory on two fronts 
during World War II—at home against racism and abroad for democracy. Some scholars suggest one of the motivations for 
changes in race policy in America was that American leaders did not want to be embarrassed by enemies in the war who called 
them hypocrites for treating their own citizens so poorly. 
31
 I choose to focus on the years 1946-1962 because I want to capture the impact of voters who moved to cities during the second 
wave of migration. Because the second wave began in 1941, I assume a sufficient number of migrants would have moved and 
become eligible to participate in local politics by 1946. I end the period at 1962 to remain consistent between chapters. Later, I 
will argue that presidential candidates JFK and LBJ were concerned about Black migration because it had the potential to affect 
their chances of winning the Presidency. I assume that national party leaders understood the potential importance of Black voters 
to the Democratic Party before the 1964 election. 
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apparatuses. I hope to illustrate a relationship between the number of Black voters, the margin of 
victory in elections, and the likelihood that local party leaders were sympathetic to Black 
concerns. 
In addition to limited discussion of the Great Migration in the revised understandings of 
post-war politics, there is little attention to Black politics on the ground in cities and states. 
Where scholars do consider local politics, their primary concern is often analysis of parties as 
machines (Erie, 1988) or the development of liberal positions on specific (e.g. housing, fair 
employment, or public accommodations) policies in cities (Grimshaw, 1992; Sugrue, 1996; 
Sonenshein, 1993; Lewinson, 1974; Countryman, 2006). If we accept revisions to conventional 
explanations of party change—that change was slow moving and began at the local, state and 
congressional levels—then we should unpack the reasons politicians would choose to alter their 
positions. It is not enough to say parties changed to meet the demands of their coalitions. Who 
were the individuals and groups in these coalitions? What made their level of influence grow to 
the point where party leaders felt compelled to articulate the positions of the coalition?  
Understanding the relationship between sub-national politics and party position change 
on civil rights is important to understanding this period for at least two reasons. First, the effects 
of the Great Migration on the political environment in states and localities gave Black people 
their strength as coalition partners, capable of demanding change, from their strength in numbers. 
Their willingness to vote for either party made them a swing constituency and compounded their 
strength. Therefore, a direct relationship between a local politician’s willingness to take racially 
liberal positions and an increase in the number of migrants in a location is plausible. Second, the 
EC’s placement of power in particular states contributed to the importance of Black voters 
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because they migrated to strategically important states.32 Black voting behavior in states and 
large cities became an important calculation of the national parties as migration continued 
because of the potential consequences for the EC. 
Expectations 
My goal in this chapter is to show that the growth of the Black population in Northern 
cities and states was an impetus for position change in the Democratic Party. To show the 
relationship between migration and party position change, I measure the growth of Black 
influence in localities. I define influence as: 1) Black voters’ status as the BOP in an election and 
2) Black candidates’ ability to win elective office. 
First, I measure Black voters’ position as the BOP in elections from 1946-1962. I focus 
on mayoral and U.S. Senate elections to provide a sense of Black voters’ importance at 
municipal and statewide levels. I expect that Black voters’ BOP position will depend on the level 
of analysis. White communities frequently used housing covenants to limit Black people to 
small, densely populated parts of the central cities. Although this kind of discrimination was 
wrong—and later deemed unconstitutional—it created a source of political power for Black 
people in some Northern cities and states. Accordingly, I expect to observe that Black voters will 
be the BOP in small districts (e.g. ward based, congressional, or state legislative) but that they 
will not hold the same position in statewide contests. I also expect their influence as a bloc 
increased as their numbers grew in cities. In other words, it is more likely they were the BOP at 
the end of the period than at the beginning because by the 1960s, larger numbers of Black people 
were living in the North. Where Black voters are the BOP, we are more likely to observe local 
politicians changing their positions to gain their support. 
                                                 
32
 I further discuss the connection between the EC and Black voters in the next chapter. 
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Second, I measure the number of Black elected officials in the five cities of interest, with 
the expectation that Black voters would be inclined to vote for Black politicians—who they 
believed would best represent their interests—and that the number of Black elected officials 
increased along with the number of Black voters in cities. I consider Black voters’ ability to 
attain elected office as a proxy for their growing political influence in cities. In accounting for 
Black elected officials, I chose to focus on election to local municipal positions and state 
legislatures. Analyzing municipal posts should make clear the strength (or lack of strength) of 
Black voters at the local level. I included state legislatures because the literature suggests policy 
change on civil rights began at the state legislative level (Chen, 2006; Pearson, Schickler, 
Feinstein, 2010). I expect that states with large Black delegations will lead the pack on civil 
rights legislation.33 
Balance of Power in Great Migration Cities 
Calculating the Balance of Power in Local Politics 
I defined the BOP as a BVAP that is equal to or greater than the margin of victory in a 
given election. Data about the exact number of Black voters registered in states and localities is 
unavailable before 1965.34 To approximate, I used the Detailed Characteristics of the Population 
section from the 1940, 1950 and 1960 censuses to construct a dataset of population information 
for Black voters in each state from 1946-1962. 
                                                 
33
 I would have liked to consider balance of power in congressional races. However, state data about the number of Black voters 
in each congressional district is unavailable before 1963. 
34
 The NAACP has some estimates for larger cities. However, they do not make clear how they obtained their information. In 
most cases, the other information about the number of Black voters registered in cities or state legislative districts is derived by 
estimating the number of people registered in predominantly Black precincts. 
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To estimate how many migrants had the ability to vote or participate in politics, I 
included all people classified as Negro, age 20 and older—also referred to as the BVAP.35 Figure 
4.1, below, depicts the BVAP in the five cities. I gathered the same information for the total 
number of voters in the population, regardless of race—henceforth referred to as TVAP. Figure 
4.2 shows Black voters as a percentage of the TVAP. 
Figure 4.1: Growth of the Estimated Black Voting Age Population by Thousands, 1940-1970  
Source: U.S. Census (1940-1970) Detailed Characteristics of the Population 
 
To simulate the normal participation patterns in elections, I compared the entire BVAP, 
two-thirds of the BVAP, and one-half and of the BVAP to the total population. The rationale 
behind these numbers was threefold. First, as previously mentioned, a party does not need the 
entire vote of a group for that group to have a positive, important impact on an election. Parties 
are looking for enough voters to get to their “win number” and understand this will mean 
drawing on more than one group of people. Second, analyzing a smaller portion of the 
population than the total allows for analysis of imperfect data about the number of Black people 
                                                 
35
 Although the voting age was 21 until 1976, I have included all persons age 20 and older because this is how the census 
presents the information; the census breaks ages down into five-year increments. I use voting age population as a proxy for the 
number of Black people with the potential to register and vote because most states did not keep track of race in voter registration 
data during the period of interest. Because we do not have official voter registration based on race, it is difficult to say with 
absolute certainty what would happen with Black voters in an election before that election occurred. 
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in a city who were registered to vote and/or turned out to vote. I estimated the number of persons 
who were registered to vote in the BVAP at 67 percent. Finally, to account for the fact that fewer 
than the total number of registered voters turns out to the polls on Election Day, I analyze the 
BVAP at 50 percent.36 
Figure 4.2: Black Voting Age Population as a Percentage of the Total Voting Age Population, 1940-1960.  
Source: U.S. Census Bureau (1940-1970) Detailed Characteristics of the Population. 
 
Ability to Affect Electoral Outcomes 
In determining whether a group was the BOP, the margin of victory is important because 
it tells us how many votes could change the outcome of the election. However, the margin of 
victory is not the only important part of understanding how groups of voters affect elections. 
Parties must also consider that obtaining an electoral majority will require support from more 
than one group. Therefore, any group that is a sizable portion of the margin of victory should be 
important to a party for its potential to add to the party’s win number—even if the size of a group 
                                                 
36
 Although we might expect different rates of voting among Black people of this period because the history of 
disenfranchisement, scholars find that migrants to Northern cities were more likely to register to vote than counterparts of their 
race who were already living in the North or Whites who lived in the North (Wilson, 1960; Gosnell, 1967; Gregory, 2005). Of 
Black voters in Chicago during the 1944 presidential election, Grimshaw (1992) writes, “black turnout increased by 4 percent, 
from an already extraordinarily high 91 percent in 1940 to a phenomenal 95 percent” (p. 53). Considering this account, my 
estimate of 50 percent is very conservative. However, I have chosen this figure because Chicago’s registration and participation 
are frequently described as an anomaly and because similar information is not available for all of the electoral contests under 
consideration. 
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is not enough to win or change the outcome of the election outright. Beyond the sheer size of a 
group, parties must also consider the costs and benefits of constructing a new coalition. The 
party’s strategy—either to stay the same or to court new groups—has consequences. If a party 
remains the same, it may forgo the benefits of incorporating a new group. However, adding new 
members to the group’s existing coalition might create tension or resistance among current 
coalition members. The Democratic Party of the post-war period had to weigh the costs and 
benefits of incorporating Black voters into their coalition. 
For Black voters to be worth the risks to the Democratic Party in the North during the 
post-war period—and positively affect the party’s electoral calculus—there needed to be enough 
of them in an area they could reasonably and substantially contribute to the party’s win number 
or to the construction of a viable electoral majority. I assume parties will be particularly 
concerned with trying to meet the needs of Black voters in cities when those voters had the 
ability to swing the election. In the next section, I will analyze election returns under the 
expectations I described earlier in the chapter. 
Were Black Voters the Balance of Power in Cities? 
There were 25 mayoral contests from 1946-1962 in the five cities under consideration. 
When considering all cities, Black voters were the balance of power in mayoral elections on 20 
of the 25 occasions—80 percent of the time. When I adjusted the BVAP to simulate probable 
registration levels and turnout, Black voters were the BOP on 16 and 12 occasions, respectively. 
Those totals appear in Table 4.2, below. 
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Table 4.2- Balance of Power in Elections  
Note: Calculated by comparing the BVAP to the margin of victory in elections 
 
In senate elections, Black voters were the BOP in 22 of the 33 electoral contests (67% of 
elections) for the five states under consideration between 1946 and 1962. When I adjust the 
BVAP for likely voter registration and turnout, they were the BOP in 17 and 13 elections of the 
33 under consideration. Black voters’ position as the BOP in elections varies over time and by 
city, with some places having enough Black voters to overcome the margin of victory on most 
occasions and others rarely having enough Black people to be the BOP. In the next section, I 
discuss the variations in Black voters’ position as the BOP and their ability to win elected office 
in the cities and states of interest. 
The Great Migration and Local Parties 
Chicago 
Chicago is important to understanding the politics of the Great Migration as a city 
steeped in machine politics. Along with New York, it provides the opportunity to study how 
machines interacted with migrants. Chicago was home to a relatively powerful Black sub-
machine from the 1920s until the collapse of the Daley machine in the 1970s (Grimshaw, 1992; 
Walton, 1972). The city’s strong party tradition and system of ward-based representation led to 
greater representation of Black people in elected office than in the other Great Migration cities. 
The first Black migrants to Chicago came soon after the Civil War. Many thought of the 
city as a “mecca” for those wishing to migrate (Johnson and Campbell, 1981: 65). Migration to 
Chicago increased rapidly as Southerners moved for work in the war industries during World 
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War I. The rate of movement into the city increased tremendously during World War II. From 
1940-1960, the number of Black people in Chicago rose from 277,731 to 812,836—an increase 
of 535,105 or 192 percent. As a percentage of the total population, the number of Black people in 
the city grew from 8.18 percent in 1940 to 22.89 percent in 1960. The BVAP percentage also 
increased between 1940 and 1960; during those 20 years, it increased from 8 to 19.6 percent. 
Black people were active in Chicago politics well before the 1940s. They first 
participated as Republicans, electing Edward Wright as ward committeeman for the second ward 
in 1920 and Oscar DePreist to Congress in 1929. The masses of Black voters did not begin 
voting for Democrats at the local level until the 1939 election. However, their relationship to the 
Democratic Party became unstable in the 1940s as Black voters observed differences in the party 
at the local and presidential levels. When local Democrats deviated from the national party’s 
racially liberal lead, Black voters showed their disappointment by withholding support for the 
local Democratic machine. Their disapproval was evidenced by decreased Black support for 
Democratic mayoral candidates (Grimshaw, 1992: 57). 
Balance of Power in Local Elections 
Three Democrats served as mayor of Chicago from 1946-1962: Edward Kelly, from 
1933-1947; Martin Kennelly, from 1947 to 1955; and Richard Daley from 1955 onward. There 
were five mayoral elections during the period of interest. Black voters were the BOP in three of 
the five mayoral elections. They could have been very important coalition partners in three 
elections: the 1951 election of Martin Kennelly and Richard Daley’s 1955 and 1963 election. 
Their position as the BOP holds when I adjust for voter registration and likely turnout.  
Although the data suggest Martin Kennelly could have benefited from a coalition with 
Black voters for his 1951 election, history shows he did not. He barely got a majority of the vote 
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in the predominantly Black precincts. During his tenure as mayor, he took several positions on 
race that made him unacceptable to the Black community. Kennelly’s stance on racial issues, 
which were vastly different than the national party, cost Chicago Democrats the support of Black 
voters at the local level—even as the city’s Black voters were supporting the Democrats in 
presidential elections.  
During Richard Daley’s first campaign in 1955, Black voters’ interactions with the local 
Democratic Party improved. Partly in reaction to the machine’s decision not to slate Kennelly 
again, they gave Daley and the party overwhelming majorities of their support. Their support 
extended to Dailey’s second election.  
Black voters’ importance to the Daley victory of 1963 was widely reported.37 
“Tuesday’s election saw nine predominantly Negro wards account for 77 percent 
of Mayor Elect Richard Daley’s 127,199 margin of victory. Five central 
Southside wards the 2
nd
, 3
rd
, 4
th
, 6
th
 and 20
th
, accounted for a 49,363 edge. The 
16
th
 ward (Englewood) gave Daley a 5,840 margin and three Westside wards, the 
24
th
, 27
th
 and 28
th
, accounted for 42,473 of the bulge.”38 
Daley responded by increasing the number of Black people appointed to chairmanships in 
the city council (Grimshaw, 1992: 106). 
Black voters were less powerful as a statewide constituency in Illinois between 1946 and 
1962. In the six senatorial contests during the period of interest, Black voters were the BOP five 
times. When accounting for likely voter registration, the BVAP was more than the margin of 
victory on two out of six occasions. The BOP only holds in one election after considering likely 
                                                 
37
 COLEMAN, T. (1963, Apr 04). Negro vote credited for Daley victory. Chicago Daily Defender (Daily Edition) (1960-1973). 
Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/493957828?accountid=14214 
38
 Chicago gets fifth alderman, aids Daley. (1955, Apr 16). The Chicago Defender (National Edition) (1921-1967). Retrieved 
from http://search.proquest.com/docview/492949121?accountid=14214 
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turnout as well as likely voter registration—the 1962 contest that produced Republican Everett 
Dirksen.39 
Election of Black Candidates to Office 
Black people served on Chicago’s city council beginning with the 1915 election of Oscar 
DePreist. As the population increased, so did the number of Black elected representatives. 
Between 1946 and 1962, seven Black men won election to city council (Archibald J. Carey, 
Sidney Jones, Claude Holman, Ben Lewis, Kenneth Campbell, Robert Miller and William 
Harvey). By 1959, six of them were serving together on the city council.40 
In summary, Chicago was an early destination for migrants, which led to earlier political 
involvement by Black people. During my period of interest, the Black population nearly tripled 
and they were the BOP in three of five mayoral elections. The local Democratic Party was 
responsive to the Black community through the Black sub-machine and Black elected officials. 
Detroit 
During World War II, Detroit was home to many defense industries. “Sixty thousand 
Black migrants moved [to Detroit] in the first few years of the war” because of increasing access 
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 Dirksen went on to author the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 
40
 FOREE, J. (1959, May 09). Negro aldermen have much in common; Harvey oldest. The Chicago Defender (National Edition) 
(1921-1967). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/493030926?accountid=14214. 
Negro voters stem GOP tide. (1946, Nov 16). The Chicago Defender (National Edition) (1921-1967). Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/492746365?accountid=14214. 
Chicagoans have 5 of 50 aldermen. (1955, Apr 30). The Chicago Defender (National Edition) (1921-1967). Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/492835518?accountid=14214. 
JET magazine April 21, 1955 page 7. 
FOREE, J. (1959, May 12). Holman called most vocal among 6 negro aldermen. Daily Defender (Daily Edition) (1956-1960). 
Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/493742895?accountid=14214 
3 seek Chicago council posts. (1954, Nov 27). The Chicago Defender (National Edition) (1921-1967). Retrieved from 
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COLEMAN, T. (1963, Feb 27). 6 Negro aldermen retain posts; Despres wins, McNairy fails bid. Chicago Daily Defender (Daily 
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FOREE, J. (1959, May 11). Kenneth Campbell makes history in city council. Daily Defender (Daily Edition) (1956-1960). 
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to work provided by the federal Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) and anti-
discrimination laws (Sugrue, 2008: 66). Further, Henry Ford’s willingness to hire Black workers 
and “promise of five dollars a day reached black and white workers in the South” and helped 
stimulate their movement to the Motor City (Thomas, 1992:24). In 1940, Detroit’s Black 
population was 149,119, a number doubled to 300,506 by 1950 and tripled to 482,223 by 1960—
for a total increase of 333,104 (233%) over the span of 20 years. Black people accounted for 9.17 
percent of the VAP in 1940. Because of normal population growth, continued in-migration and 
White flight, their percentage of Detroit’s TVAP was 25.4 percent by 1960. 
Detroit’s city charter called for non-partisan elections and a council-mayor system of 
government.41 Along with Los Angeles, Detroit had a weaker party system than the other Great 
Migration cities considered here. The city’s electorate was highly fragmented—with many 
diverse opinions about the best structure for city government and different approaches to the 
treatment of Black citizens. However, mayors with conservative racial ideologies successfully 
retained control of “the Northernmost Southern city” until the 1960s (Sugrue, 2008: 132).  
Black Voters as the Balance of Power 
Four men served as Detroit’s mayor between 1946 and 1962: (D) Eugene Van Antwerp 
(1948-1950); (R) Albert Cobo (1950-1957); (R) Louis Miriani (1957-1962); and (D) Jerome 
Cavanagh (1962-1970). There were six mayoral elections during the period of interest and 
Detroit’s BVAP was the BOP on four out of the six occasions—even when adjusting the 
population by two-thirds and by half. Black voters could have been an important factor in the 
elections of Eugene Van Antwerp, Albert Cobo (elected twice) and Jerome Cavanagh. Media 
reports detail the importance of Black voters and organizations in the 1961 election of Cavanagh.  
                                                 
41
 The city had biennial elections until 1953, when the city charter changed the term to four years. 
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Despite a history of conservative mayors, there were many liberal residents of Detroit. 
Liberal groups—Black people, White liberal sympathizers, labor leaders and civic 
organizations—had not been able to translate their beliefs into electoral victory during the 1940s 
and 1950s. Even when it seemed conservatives would likely be defeated in elections, they were 
able to remain in power because union workers were often willing to vote against their economic 
interests for the sake of maintaining segregated neighborhoods. For example, despite the fact the 
United Auto Workers organized George Edwards’s 1949 campaign for mayor, the incumbent 
Albert Cobo won in many White, working class precincts (Sugrue, 1996).42 
Mayors Cobo and Miriani used race and housing as wedge issues in their bids for mayor. 
With improvement of central Detroit as his stated goal, Albert Cobo supported an aggressive 
slum clearance and highway construction program, whose effect was construction of a highway 
through the Black community and removal of the residents without alternatives for housing 
(Sugrue, 2000: 48). Louis Miriani became mayor in 1957 after Albert Cobo died of a heart 
attack. Later that year, he won election to office in his own right. Miriani was more conservative 
than Cobo on racial issues. Through his anti-crime plan, he dramatically increased police 
presence in Black neighborhoods. “During the first forty-eight hours of the crackdown, Detroit 
police arrested more than six hundred people” and many of them were arrested without 
legitimate cause for suspicion (Turrini, 1999: 12). Miriani began to change his stance on racial 
issues once it became clear Black voters were a potentially important swing vote in local 
elections (Sugrue, 1996). Although conservative mayors of the 1940s and 1950s found enough 
support to win and maintain elected office, by the 1960s it was becoming clear that they would 
need to branch out if they expected to maintain power in city government. 
                                                 
42
 Cobo was re-elected to office two more times in 1951 and 1953. 
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The liberal coalition’s fortunes changed along with the composition of the city in the 
1960s. By then, nearly one-third of Detroit’s total population was Black. Black organizations like 
the NAACP, the Trade Union Leadership Organization (TCLU) and the Detroit Cotillion Club 
organized alongside the Black community at-large to support a liberal candidate for mayor—
Jerome Cavanagh. His election was both a referendum from the Black community on the 
incumbent Miriani’s heavy-handed stance in law enforcement and a show of support for 
Cavanagh’s liberal positions on civil rights issues. In response to the outpouring of support from 
the Black community, Cavanagh increased the number of Black employees at City Hall and 
appointed a new police commissioner who was well accepted by the Black community (Turrni, 
1999:15). 
On the statewide level, Black voters were the BOP six times in the seven United States 
Senate elections during the period of interest. They persisted as the BOP even after estimating 
for voter registration and turnout. 
Election of Black Candidates to Office 
As political science theories would predict, because of the city’s at-large election type 
and weak party system, Black representation on Detroit’s nine-member Common Council proved 
difficult to come by for Detroit’s Black residents. Throughout the period of interest, William T. 
Patrick was the only Black elected official in the city’s legislative body.43 Before him, Charles 
Diggs, Jr. ran for a position on the council but failed to win enough votes to obtain a seat. 
The challenges of running in a non-partisan, city-wide election are evidenced by the fact 
Black politicians in Michigan had more success in attaining positions in the state legislature and 
United States Congress, where the districts are narrowly defined. For example, Charles Diggs, Jr. 
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 Black World/Negro Digest, May 1965, page 32. 
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changed his approach and ran for a seat in the Michigan state legislature. He won election to the 
state Senate in 1951 and then to the Congress in 1955. 
Detroit’s migration was shaped by its access to jobs in the defense industry, and its Black 
population tripled between 1940-1960. I found that Black voters in Detroit were the BOP in most 
elections, but their position did not translate into political power until the 1960s. However, when 
the party became responsive, it did so through Mayoral candidate James Canavaugh. 
Los Angeles 
Black migration to Los Angeles occurred later than it did for the other Great Migration 
cities—with the start of WWII instead of during WWI. Migrants to California moved for work in 
the defense industries where opportunities were plentiful as a result of the 1942 Executive Order 
9066, which confined Japanese immigrants to internment camps and created a severe labor 
shortage (Jones, et. al., 2008). Thousands of southerners moved to California to fill the void and 
“took jobs in the shipbuilding and airframe industries” (Flamming, 2001: 292). Before 
internment, the census only recorded 63,774 Black people in Los Angeles. By 1950, the Black 
population increased by 167 percent to 170,880 and the Black percentage of the city’s population 
grew from 4.2 to 8.7 percent. The number of Black people in Los Angeles continued to grow 
between 1950 and 1960 to 334,763—13 percent of the city’s population, five times the original 
population. In fact, Los Angeles had the largest growth rate among Black people of any city 
between 1940 and 1970—a 1,046 percent increase (Sides, 2003: 218). This massive growth of 
the Black population created problems in race relations for the residents of Los Angeles that 
would have a tremendous impact on local politics. 
Local politics in Los Angeles was conservative, reform oriented, and non-partisan. These 
factors led to a weak party system, which presented challenges for migrants as they sought to 
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become involved in the political process. “There were no political party organizations to recruit 
precinct captains and mobilize minority voters” (Sonenshein, 1993: 33). As we should expect in 
this setting (Erie, 1988), local elected officials initially chose to ignore Black voters rather than 
incorporate them because their numbers were too small to influence political outcomes. Local 
politicians were more concerned with economic development and reform than civil rights issues 
like providing protections from discrimination in housing and employment to Black residents of 
Los Angeles. 
Black Voters as the Balance of Power 
Four men served as Los Angeles’s mayor from 1946 to 1962: (R) Fletcher Bowron 
(1949-1953); (R) C. Norris Poulson (1953-1961); and (D) Samuel Yorty (1961-1973). There 
were four mayoral elections in Los Angeles from 1946-1962. The total BVAP was greater than 
the margin of victory in Los Angeles on four out of five occasions. Los Angeles had more 
variation after adjustments to the BVAP than other cities. When I adjusted the BVAP to estimate 
registration rates, Black voters were only the BOP on three occasions. The frequency dropped to 
two out of five occasions when considering likely turnout. Based on these numbers, it is safe to 
say Black voters would have been an important consideration in the 1953 election of C. Norris 
Poulson and the 1961 election of Samuel Yorty. In 1953, Norris was running for mayor against 
the incumbent, Fletcher Bowron. The margin of victory in that election was 34,898 and the 
BVAP was 112,780.  
In the next decade, the growth of Los Angeles’s Black community would prove important 
to local politics in mayoral and city council contests. By 1961, large numbers of Black people 
had settled in Los Angeles and were in a good position to participate in the election—the total 
Black VAP was 203,597. The California Eagle, Los Angeles’ most prominent Black newspaper, 
 68 
encouraged Black voters to defy the Democratic establishment and be the swing vote in the 1961 
mayoral election (Sonenshein, 1993: 39). Yorty won the election by a margin of 15,725 votes 
while running against a Republican and without support from the Democratic Party. From the 
three Black wards of Los Angeles, Yorty earned 20,587 votes. As a result, the new mayor and 
other observers “attributed his victory to minority support” (Sides, 2003: 155; Sonenshein, 1993: 
39).44 Owing his victory to Black voters, Yorty increased the number of African Americans on 
the mayor’s staff and on city commissions (Sonenshein, 1993: 39). 
In statewide contests, California is different from the other cities in this study because 
Black voters did not hold the BOP—even when considering the entire BVAP—in any U.S. 
Senate contest. The findings that Black voters were less frequently the BOP in California 
elections make sense for two reasons. First, the Black population in the state was not a large, or 
critical, percentage of the total population until the mid-1960s. Second, California Senate 
elections had very large margins of victory. The margin of victory in these contests ranged from 
260,906 in 1946 to 727,644 in the 1962 contest.45 
Election of Black Candidates to Office 
Like the tide of Black migration, Black voters’ ability to hold municipal office in Los 
Angeles also came later than it did in other cities. Although other Great Migration cities had 
achieved Black representation by the 1920s and 1930s, Los Angeles did not have representation 
at the municipal level until 1963 (Sides, 2003: 157). There were several barriers to office holding 
for Black people in Los Angeles. The first and greatest hurdle was lack of a strong party 
organization and gerrymandering by current elected officials. Los Angeles had 15 large city 
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 Yorty continued to enjoy support from the Black community until he refused to support the candidacy of Tom Bradley for city 
council in 1969. Subsequently, Bradley defeated him in the mayoral contest of 1973. 
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 These numbers exclude the 1952 special contest of William Knowland, who won by a margin of 3,440,178 votes. 
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council districts and White politicians worked to divide the Black vote among the White districts 
of Los Angeles. Eventually, to finally make an impact, minority communities worked together 
because “everybody who was different from the white conservative mode was excluded [from 
politics]” (Sonenshein, 1993). 
Second, the Black community of Los Angeles struggled to organize because it was more 
geographically scattered than Black communities in other states. Housing covenants from the 
1920s confined Black people to a few discontinuous parts of Los Angeles. Initially, the growing 
Black population of the city did not generate concern among the White community—their 
neighborhoods were far enough away from Black communities that the groups did not interact 
frequently. However, tensions between the races began to flare after the city experienced a 
tremendous boom in its Black population during the second wave of the Great Migration. By the 
1960s, the number of Black people in Los Angeles became noticeable as the traditionally Black 
parts of the city became over-crowded. 
At the local level, a change in the reapportionment process allowed an opportunity for 
Black people to attain municipal office in 1963.46 Tom Bradley, Billy Mills and Gilbert Lindsay 
were elected to city council positions, representing the mostly Black eighth, ninth, and tenth city 
districts for the 1963-1967 term (Soneshein, 1993: 44).  
Although Black voters were unable to achieve municipal office until the 1960s, they had 
been serving at the state assembly since 1918. The first Black assemblyman from Los Angeles—
Frederick Roberts—served for 16 years as a Republican. During this time he worked for civil 
rights legislation. In 1934, Augustus Hawkins replaced Roberts as the Democratic assemblyman 
from the Black area of Los Angeles. In 1959, William Rumford was elected from Berkley and 
                                                 
46
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the California assembly had two Black assemblymen serving together. They worked together 
with Phillip Burton, a White liberal from San Francisco, for civil rights legislation. In the 1959 
session, they helped secure passage of, 
“a fair employment act, which established a California FEPC; the Unruh Act, updated 
civil rights legislation that increased the minimum fine for racial discrimination in public 
places; and a rather weak act prohibiting racial discrimination in public housing, named 
after Hawkins” (Flamming 2001: 298). 
 
In 1962, Mervyn Dymally and F. Douglas Ferell—both Black men elected from the Los 
Angeles area—won seats in the state assembly, which meant there were now three Black men 
serving the state of California in its assembly. 47 In the first part of their term, the legislature 
passed the Rumford Housing Act in 1963, which strengthened the Hawkins public housing bill 
of 1959. 
California migration picked up in the late 1950s and 1960—almost doubling within that 
decade. As California’s population grew, so did its number of Black elected officials and the 
Democrats’ responsiveness. By the 1960s, migrants had greater representation in city hall and 
achieved passage of civil rights legislation from the state assembly. 
New York 
New York has been home to the largest number of Black people living outside the South 
since the Great Migration began. During the first wave of the migration, migrants settled in 
Harlem. The first major increase in the Black population was indicated in the 1930 census, when 
their numbers doubled—going from 198,483 to 412,814. The number of Black people in New 
York continued to grow tremendously after WWII; there was a net population increase of 
346,970 between 1940 and 1950. Also during that decade, Black New Yorkers began to reside in 
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areas outside Harlem, specifically Brooklyn and the Bronx (Lewinson, 1974). By 1960, there 
were 1,087,931 Black people in New York City—almost 14 percent of the total population. 
Black Voters as the Balance of Power 
The city charter of New York called for a strong-mayor council type of government. New 
York City was a machine-dominated city, with a strong party system. The Democratic Party’s 
Tammany Hall was the most powerful organization in local politics. From 1946-1962, three men 
served as mayor: (D) William O’Dwyer (1946-1950); (Experience) Vincent Impellitteri (1950-
1953); and (D) Robert Wagner (1953-1965). There were five mayoral elections in New York 
from 1946 to 1962 with these elections showing variation in the relationship between the margin 
of victory and the BVAP. On three of five occasions, Black voters were the BOP. When I 
adjusted for voter registration and likely voters, the BVAP was only larger than the margin of 
victory on one occasion—in the contest between Vincent Impellitteri and Ferdinan Pecora. 
Impellitteri ascended to the position of mayor after William O’Dwyer vacated the seat to become 
ambassador to Mexico.48 In the election to fill O’Dwyer’s seat, the Democratic Party supported 
Ferdinand Pecora because they did not believe Impellitteri was fit to serve as mayor. Impellitteri 
won the election by a margin of 225,824. After accounting for likely turnout (half of the total 
BVAP), there were 262,163 available Black votes—more than enough to change the outcome of 
the election. However, other than appointing a Black person to the position of deputy 
commissioner of the police department and slating a Black candidate for borough president of 
Manhattan, Impellitteri ignored the Black community. He paid little attention to the Black 
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community’s appeals for justice after racially motivated misconduct by the police department in 
two separate incidents (Biondi, 2003).49 
There were six U.S. Senatorial elections in New York during the period of interest and 
Black voters were the BOP five times. After considering likely registration, the BVAP was larger 
than the margin on four occasions and on two occasions after considering likely turnout. 
Election of Black Candidates to Office 
Between 1946 and 1962, Black residents of New York struggled to achieve elected 
positions in the Democratic establishment. New York City was different from other large centers 
of the population—for example Detroit and Chicago—where migrants were concentrated in a 
central location under the control of one machine and one political/geographic jurisdiction. New 
York’s migrants’ ability to participate and hold office became complicated as the growing Black 
population began to spread across boroughs because each borough had a separate political 
apparatus (Biondi, 2003: 208). Politicians created gerrymandered districts to reduce the 
likelihood that Black people were elected to office from the predominantly Black areas of 
Harlem and Brooklyn. Early on, the best Black politicos could hope for was a position in the 
Black sub-machine. These posts were either appointed by the White area leader or by the 
machine-appointed Black community leaders (Bondi, 2003; Lewinson, 1974; Walton, 1972).  
Black New Yorkers’ initial response to exclusion from power in the party was to find 
other ways to impact the political system. Black voters were mobilized by third parties and 
independent organizations like the American Labor Party (ALP), the Communist Party (CP), the 
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Harlem Affairs Committee (HAC) and citizen’s aid committees like Bedford-Stuyvesant 
Political League (BSPL). Although Black third-party candidates for local office were not 
successful in their campaigns for various positions, their vote shares were notable. For example, 
Ada B. Jackson ran for a citywide seat on the Brooklyn city council and garnered 23 percent of 
the vote in her election in 1947 (Biondi, 2003: 51). She lost to the Republican candidate for the 
office, but the Democratic Party noticed her ability to get votes and they slated a Black candidate 
for that State Assembly seat in the next election. Later, in a 1949 campaign for Manhattan 
borough president, ALP candidate Ewart Guiner earned 100,000 votes—38 percent of the total 
(Biondi, 2003: 211-212).  
Eventually, even though the large Black population was not enough to constitute the BOP 
in most elections, migrants’ willingness to run as third party candidates motivated the 
Democratic Party to finally respond to pleas for Black representation within the machine (Ali, 
2008). By 1964, four Black people had been elected as Democrats to the city council.  
Philadelphia  
Migration to Philadelphia began earlier than it did in other cities. From 1914-1916, labor 
agents for the Pennsylvania and Erie railroad companies went to Florida in search of men to 
work on railroads and maintain roads (Scott, 1920). Eventually, their recruitment efforts spread 
to stimulate migration from states throughout the Southeast. From the 1910s onward, the number 
of migrants to Philadelphia increased steadily until labor shortages led to a spike in the 
population during World War II. Between 1940 and 1950, the number of Black people in 
Philadelphia grew by nearly 50 percent from 250,880 to 375,570. The proportion of Black 
people in the city’s population climbed to 26 percent by 1960. There was a corresponding 
increase in the BVAP in the city—it grew from 12 percent in 1940 to 23 percent in 1960. As 
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Philadelphia’s population changed, parties adapted by taking divergent positions on issues and 
seeking different types of voters to serve as their bases. 
Black Voters as the Balance of Power 
Philadelphia had two city charters during the period of interest. The first charter ceded 
power to political parties and machines while the second, enacted in 1951, gave more power to 
the city’s mayor and created a more professional municipal office. There were five mayoral 
contests during the period of interest and five men served as mayor of Philadelphia between 
1946 and 1962: (R) Bernard Samuel, 1941-1952; (D) Joseph Clark, 1952-1956; (D) Richardson 
Dilworth, 1956-1962; and (D) James Tate 1962-1977. When considering the entire BVAP, there 
were more potential Black voters than the margin of victory in every municipal election. 
Considering likely registrants, the BVAP is more than the margin of victory on four of five 
occasions. When accounting for those who likely voted, the BVAP is more than the margin of 
victory on two of five occasions. Therefore, Black voters could have been the BOP in the 1951 
election of Joseph Clark and the 1962 election of James Tate. Particularly interesting is the 1951 
election, where the Democrats gained control of city government for the first time in 50 years 
and Black voters turned out in large numbers to vote for Clark (Countryman, 2006: 46). 
Until the 1940s, the Durham and Vare Republican machines controlled local politics in 
Philadelphia. Two-party competition for votes in Philadelphia pushed local parties to opposite 
sides of the political spectrum on racial issues. The first time race played a major role in 
Philadelphia politics was the 1943 re-election campaign of Bernard Samuel, who served from 
1941 until 1951 and was the last of the Vare organization mayors. Republicans took a 
conservative stance on race, using it as a wedge issue to garner the support of White, working 
class citizens—who were chiefly concerned about possible integration of their neighborhoods, 
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schools and work places. To win white votes, local Republicans campaigned on promises to keep 
their neighborhoods and work places segregated and “safe” from Black people. The Democrats, 
with Black voters and labor organizations as their base, took liberal positions on race. They 
worked to earn Black votes by supporting public housing initiatives and fair treatment for Black 
employees of Philadelphia industries. During WWII and the post-war period, the parties’ 
differences on these issues played most prominently during mayoral campaigns. 
When speaking to White audiences during that campaign, Samuel and the Republican 
Party attacked the Democratic candidate, William Bullitt, on his support for Black people and 
interests. In their interactions with the Black community, Republicans used previously published 
work by Bullitt to suggest he “hates all colored people and Jews” and uses the word “nigger” 
(Wolfinger, 2007: 109). Samuel won the election of 1943 and was re-elected again in 1947. By 
his third term, Philadelphia was changing. Its citizens grew increasingly fed up with machine 
style politics and Black voters were fighting for fair employment and anti-discrimination 
legislation. 
In 1948, the state legislature, which had been liberal and Democratic for some time, 
passed a bill to allow a new city charter. Through the work of various organizations, reformers 
drafted a city charter that established a strong mayor-council form of government and placed a 
ban on “racial and religious discrimination in city employment, services and contracts.” The 
charter also specified merit as a requirement for city employment. Voters accepted the 
Philadelphia municipal charter in 1951. The issues of debate in the lead up to the charter proved 
a useful frame for the mayoral election that year. Democrats responded to growing weakness in 
the Republican Party’s position and calls for change in government and by making corruption in 
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government and support for Black interests central platform points in the 1951 mayoral 
campaign. 
The Black population in Philadelphia continued to grow. By the time Mayor Samuel left 
office in 1951, Philadelphia’s Black population jumped to 18 percent from 13 percent in 1940. 
The change in the demography of the city was because of both the migration of Black people 
from the South and the movement of White families out of the center cities into suburban areas. 
“Democrats knew that if they could routinely gain two-thirds or more of the black ballots, they 
needed less than half of the white vote to win” (Wolfinger, 2007: 232). Beyond population 
differences, the Black electorate was becoming more active in organizations that sought to 
promote the concerns of Black people by influencing government. Local Democrats in 
Philadelphia continued to support Black interests in the 1950s and 1960s with support for a Fair 
Employment Practices Commission as the centerpiece of its strategy. 
Black voters were consistently important in Pennsylvania U.S. Senatorial contests. The 
BVAP was larger than the margin of victory in five of six elections, regardless of adjustments for 
likely registration and turnout.  
Election of Black Candidates to Office 
The Black community of Philadelphia succeeded in winning election to local office. The 
progress in enactment of liberal legislation reflects the size of the Black population and the 
competitive nature of elections in the city and state. As mentioned above, Philadelphia was 
among the first cities to incorporate non-discrimination clauses into its formal governing 
structure. Five Black men served on the Philadelphia City Council between 1948 and 1962. The 
first two, James Irving (1936-1948) and Woodie Armstrong (1948-1952), were Republicans. 
Following the developments in local politics, related to the city charter, the Black members of 
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the city commission were members of the Democratic Party: Raymond Alexander (1952-1959); 
Marshall Shepard (1955-1968); and Thomas McIntosh (1955-1968).50 Black candidates had 
greater success in the Pennsylvania state legislature. Twelve Black people, including one 
woman, served in the state House of Representatives during the period of interest. Despite their 
progress in state and local politics, Philadelphians did not elect a member of the race to Congress 
until 1958—following the election of Black Congressmen from Illinois, New York and 
Michigan. 
As previously mentioned, migration to Philadelphia began early; however, Black voters’ 
ability to impact local politics was constrained by the city charter, which located power in the 
Republican Party. In Philadelphia, Black folks were elected to the state assembly before they 
were elected to city offices. The Democratic Party’s responsiveness was related to increases in 
population and came from the state level instead of the local level. Democrat’s liberal position 
was also driven by their desire to separate themselves from the Republican Party. They needed 
Blacks to get in power. 
Conclusion 
I have argued that Black voters affected local politics in the cities where they settled, 
through their strength in numbers and increasing ability to earn elected office. To support this 
claim, I estimated the proportion of possible Black voters in Great Migration cities and 
calculated the extent to which they were likely to influence the outcome of important elections. 
Considering the total number of people in the BVAP, Black voters were a significant portion of 
the margin of victory in many mayoral and senatorial elections from 1946-1962. However, when 
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I adjust the BVAP to consider possible voter registration and turnout, Black voters were less 
frequently the BOP. These adjustments are important for a full understanding of the likely 
impact of Black voters during the period of interest. Even considering the changes after 
adjustments, it is plausible that the number of Black people in the TVAP was sufficient to 
encourage local partisans to take positions toward the goal of seeking Black votes. 
Black voters were most often the balance of power in Detroit, where their numbers were 
greater than the margin of victory on four of six occasions. This is an interesting finding because 
it runs counter to my expectations that liberal politicians would be elected when Black voters are 
the BOP. Because of the non-partisan election system and cross pressures presented by racial 
issues, Detroit voters were more likely to elect conservative mayors than their party affiliations 
might have suggested. In other words, Democratic voters often supported Republicans for office 
in Detroit, which changed the political calculus of local elections. Detroit’s elections are also 
different from the other cities in this paper because the margins of victory are much smaller than 
in other cities. On the other hand, Philadelphia with its competition among parties met my 
expectations. It produced liberal policies among Democrats earlier and had a decent percentage 
of Black representation. 
Although the numbers of Black people in city populations were growing, so was the 
likelihood they would be elected to office. By the 1960s—and before the Voting Rights Act—
Black people were serving in posts from municipal to congressional levels in all of the Great 
Migration cities. The likelihood of finding a Black office holder in the city varied over time and 
varied based on the structure of elections in a city. Chicago, with its large, densely packed Black 
population, strong party system and ward-based elections experienced the earliest, most 
consistent Black representation in elected office. On the other hand, Detroit struggled to achieve 
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municipal representation because of the city’s at-large, non-partisan election type. Los Angeles 
struggled it lacked a critical mass of Black people until the 1950s. Black voters also faced the 
challenges of non-partisan systems and district lines drawn to prevent non-white citizens from 
holding office. Although progress happened differently among the cities, it is clear Black voters 
increasingly influenced their local communities during the period of interest.  
Overall, Black voters’ migration to the North strengthened their ability to affect local 
elections and was the foundation of party change for Democrats. Among other important 
developments of the time, careful examination of demographic change brought by the Great 
Migration is important to understanding party position change on civil rights issues. The 
increasing presence of Black voters made them important in local politics. Their influence 
bubbled up to state legislatures and the halls of Congress. Eventually, the national party 
apparatus began taking note of Black voters’ strength in numbers. The migrants’ impact on 
national party politics is the subject of the next chapter.
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 Chapter Five: National Balance of Power, 1948-1964 
In the previous chapter, I considered the impact of the Great Migration on politics at the 
local level. I demonstrated that the number of Black people moving to Northern cities was 
enough to impact local politics in five non-Southern cities. In this chapter, I make the case that 
Black voters’ importance in politics extended to the national level because Black voters also 
represented the BOP in important states from 1948-1960. During this time, the national 
Democratic Party
51
, mirroring party behavior at the local level in the North, recognized the 
importance of Black voters and changed their positions on civil rights issues in part to win their 
votes. 
In the first part of the chapter, I describe the importance of the Black voting bloc in terms 
of its national numerical strength from 1948-1960 in five states—California, Illinois, Michigan, 
New York and Pennsylvania. In the second part of the chapter, I describe the Democratic Party’s 
response to the Great Migration and Black voters’ position as the BOP.
52
 I use qualitative 
methods, including archival data and media analysis, to examine changes in party strategy and 
policies. First, I focus on the development of liberal positions the party platforms. Then, I 
consider campaign strategy and describe explicit outreach to Black voters, either through speech, 
communication with media outlets, or through campaign materials. I observed that the number of 
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potential Black voters grew tremendously in important states during the period of interest and 
that the Democratic Party platform became increasingly open to liberal ideas over time. Further, 
the presidential candidates, realizing the importance of Black voters, made race-specific appeals 
during the period of interest. 
National Numerical Strength 
In chapter three, I showed the growth in the total population of Black migrants.
53
 In this 
chapter, I focus on the voting age population of migrants and building on the work of chapter 
three
54
, I argue that how the growth happened is what made Black voters an important target of 
the Democratic Party. Not only did migrants move to important states, as mentioned in chapter 
four, they were usually drawn to large urban areas because of potential for work in factories and 
defense industries. Living in a condensed area increased migrants’ political worth because the 
outcome of elections in the urban areas often determined the outcome of statewide contests. 
Further, their concentration in cities made them an easy target of get-out-the-vote or voter 
registration efforts because campaigns could expend less energy to reach them but benefit greatly 
from the outreach. In the rest of the section, I describe the growth of the Black population from 
1930-1970
55
 in five states that absorbed the bulk of migrants and were important to party 
strategy at the time. 
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Figure 5.1- Distribution of Black Voting Age Population, by Percentage 1930-1970  
Source: U.S. Census Detailed Characteristics of the Population 
 
 
Before the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the BVAP was effectively limited to the number 
of Black people living in the North because Black Americans in the South faced a host of legal 
and extra-legal challenges when attempting to exercise their political rights. Legal barriers 
included grandfather clauses, literacy tests, white primaries and poll taxes. Grandfather clauses 
were used by states between 1895 and 1910, and restricted voting to individuals whose 
grandfather had been able to vote. This practice eliminated the ability to vote for anyone who 
was a descendant of a slave, which was most of the Black population at that time. Southern states 
used literacy tests until the 1960s. These tests required potential voters to read and satisfactorily 
interpret complex documents that ranged from passages of the constitution to advanced academic 
writing. Beyond that, the potential voter passed based on the subjective assessment of the test 
administrator. Southern Democrats used white primaries to exclude Black voters from primary 
elections from 1900-1960. Because the Democratic Party dominated in the South, exclusion from 
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primaries meant Black voters had no real say in who eventually held political office.
56
 Poll taxes 
required potential voters to pay a fee to vote. This type of tax existed until the 24
th
 Amendment 
to the Constitution passed in 1964. 
Extra-legal barriers to voting were intimidation and violence. Some white employers told 
their Black employees they could lose their jobs if they tried to vote. In other instances, white 
people in a community might stop conducting business with a Black person if they attempted to 
vote. In terms of violence, many Black people who attempted to vote were beaten, jailed, or even 
killed. 
The Great Migration changed the potential of the BVAP by increasing the number of 
potential voters who could exercise their right to vote. For example, although the total BVAP in 
1930 was 6.8 million, the Northern BVAP was only 1.9 million. Approximately 4.9 million 
Black voters were shut out of the process just by virtue of their residence in the South. The 
situation was much different by 1970, when more than half of the country’s Black people were 
living outside the South. Even without the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the electoral situation 
would have been much different than it was in 1930 because of the migration. Instead of having 
the vast majority of Black voters excluded from the process, the tables would be turned in the 
other direction, with slightly more Black voters being able to participate than not.
57
 Figure 5.2 
below depicts this change in the distribution and political power of this population as well as the 
overall growth in the BVAP for these five states from 1930-1970. 
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 Democrats greatly outnumbered Republicans in most of the South. Therefore, the winner of the general election was usually a 
Democrat. The primary election was most important because the winning Democrat, who would go on to defeat the Republican 
by virtue of having a larger number of supporters in the population, was chosen during the primary from among the field of other 
Democratic candidates. In other words, the person who was going to win the general election was the person who won the 
Democratic primary. 
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 The total BVAP was 12.1 million voters, with 6.4 million of them living in the North. The entire BVAP nearly doubled 
between 1930 and 1970—growing from 6,821,911 to 12,106,039. However, the BVAP in the North was only 1.9 million in 1930 
and 6.4 million in 1970. The Northern BVAP grew by 4.5 million. 
 84 
Figure 5.2- Black Voting Age Population in Five Large EC States, 1930-1970  
Source: Detailed Characteristics of the Population. U.S. Census Table 20, 1930-1970 
 
 
Although Black Americans’ exodus from the South impacted all areas of the nation, it 
was more pronounced in the large, industrial states. In this chapter, I focus on five states—
California, Illinois, Michigan, New York and Pennsylvania—that were very important to 
Democratic Party strategy and experienced tremendous growth as a result of the Great 
Migration.
58
 These states are described as key states because of the size of their population and 
their importance in EC politics.
59
 Between 1948 and 1964, these states controlled more than 75 
percent of the EC votes needed to win the presidential election.
60
  
Black voters’ importance as a target for the campaigns was not based solely on the 
increase in their numbers; it was also related to their increasing percentage in the total population 
of voters. As migrants filled the cities, many of the white residents moved out to suburbs. At the 
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same time, industries in the South were beginning to grow, which encouraged some Northerners 
to move South and further contributed to the changing composition of northern cities. The end 
result was an urban landscape with a larger percentage of Black voters than before. Whereas 
Black voters were only 5 percent or less of the TVAP in five large states in 1930, they were 
between 6.5 and 11 percent of the TVAP in 1970. Figure 5.3 depicts this growth. 
Figure 5.3- BVAP as a Percentage of TVAP  
Adapted from the US Census, Detailed Characteristics of the Populations. Table 20, 1930-1970 
 
My argument for this chapter is that these population changes helped facilitate political 
action among Democrats and eventually led to benefits for the Black community and the cause 
of civil rights. In the next part of the chapter, I discuss Democratic presidents and presidential 
candidates’ interactions with Black voters from 1948-1960. I also explain Democrats’ 
negotiations on the civil rights plank of the party’s platform.  
1948 
The midterm elections of 1946 shaped President Harry Truman’s presidential election 
campaign strategy in 1948. Inflation caused by a fight with farmers was Truman’s problem in 
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1946. The farmers won the political battle, which centered on farm prices
61
, and the result was 
very high inflation that negatively impacted the rest of the nation. In the end, farmers, labor and 
consumers expressed their discontent by voting against the Democrats in the midterm elections. 
(Martin, 1979: 69).  
On civil rights, Democrats were concerned about what might happen to the Black vote. 
Black voters supported the Republican Party before 1936, but by the 1940s, a majority of their 
support went to Democrats. Their loyalties were not clear to either of the parties. Would they 
remain in the Democratic column, or was their support attached to FDR and New Deal policies? 
Neither of the parties took Black voters support for granted. 
The National Negro Council made demands for President Truman to accept a strong civil 
rights plank and to reconvene the Congress.
62
 The organization’s executive director claimed to 
have a petition with 1.2 million signatures to support his position. Walter White made a similar 
appeal, stating he spoke for organizations whose membership totaled more than 6 million.
63
 
White went further, making clear the electoral power of the Black vote. He argued that Black 
votes were “a vital factor” in 75 Congressional districts and in 17 border and Northern states, 
where the EC vote count was 295. “In Northern and border states this year, there is a potential of 
3,000,000 Negro votes. These are independent voters tied to the apron strings of no party and in 
the bag of no politician.”
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Primaries/Candidates  
Observers and party insiders predicted that Truman would lose the 1948 presidential 
election campaign. In the fall of 1947, the Clifford Memo proposed a solution.
65
 Rowe, political 
strategist and Democratic ally, described in detail the steps President Truman needed to take if he 
planned to compete with the Republican Party in the upcoming election. Although James H. 
Rowe originally wrote it, Clark Clifford, an administration official, submitted the document for 
the President’s consideration. Rowe suggested the South was a safe bet and could be ignored in 
terms of effort, writing, “it is inconceivable that any policies imitated by the Truman 
Administration no matter how ‘liberal’ could so alienate the South in the next year that it would 
revolt” (Clifford memo, page 3). His advice was to focus the campaign’s efforts on the West, 
with the idea that if the Party could secure the South and the West, they might be able to 
withstand losses in the big states (New York, Illinois, New Jersey, Ohio and Massachusetts). 
In the discussion of groups—which also included farmers, labor and liberals—the memo 
describes “the Negro” as an important consideration. He writes: 
Theory of many professional politicians is that the northern Negro not only vote 
in a bloc but are geographically concentrated in the pivotal, large and closely 
contested electoral states such as New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Ohio and 
Michigan. This theory may or may not be absolutely true, but it is certainly close 
enough to the truth to be extremely arguable. 
The memo goes on to caution: 
Unless there are new and real efforts (as distinguished from mere political 
gestures, which are today thoroughly understood and strongly resented by 
sophisticated Negro leaders), the Negro bloc, which, certainly in Illinois and 
probably in New York and Ohio, does hold the balance of power, will go 
Republican” (Clifford Memo, pages 13-14). 
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The Rowe/Clifford memo set the tone for the campaign. In short, Rowe argued for 
pursuing Black votes and advised Truman to take liberal positions on race and labor. They 
acknowledged this could cause some problems in the South, but suggested those problems could 
be easily overcome…they were wrong. 
Truman had been taking liberal positions on race before the 1948 election. For example, 
he publicly supported the Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) in June 1945 and 
established the Committee on Civil Rights in 1946. When asked about his motivation for 
establishing the committee, he remarked it was a reaction to violence against Black veterans who 
were returning from war (Garner, 2002: 20). The committee considered issues surrounding 
lynching, voting and discrimination. The end result was a report entitled To Secure These Rights, 
which advocated for federal intervention to solve these issues. As another way to appeal to Black 
voters, Truman addressed the closing session on the annual conference of the NAACP on June 
29, 1947 (Garner, 2002: 28). 
All of these actions caused concern on the part of Southern Democrats, who believed 
Truman was more interested in winning liberal and Black votes than with keeping theirs. In 
response, Southerners worked to recruit a states’ rights candidate for the 1948 election. They 
found General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who at one point was also popular with liberals. Despite 
his popularity, Eisenhower bowed out of the race on July 5,
 
1948—just before the convention. 
Liberals agreed to support Truman following Eisenhower’s resignation. 
Convention/Platform  
As the convention approached, the President was increasingly concerned about his 
standing with Southern voters. In an effort to appease the South and show he was not too liberal 
on race issues, Truman sent a moderate civil rights platform plank to the convention, which did 
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not differ significantly from the 1944 civil rights plank. As it pertained to civil rights, the 
administration’s proposal said only that “minorities have the right to live, develop and vote 
equally with all citizens and share rights guaranteed by the constitution,” and that Congress 
should “exert ‘full constitutional powers’ to protect such rights.”
66
 
The administration plank met resistance from liberals, who wanted to push the platform 
beyond what Democrats passed in 1944. Disappointed with the President’s moderate plank, 
liberals, through the organization Americans for Democratic Action (ADA)
67
, worked to pass 
their own civil rights platform in 1948. Liberals believed the 1948 plank should explicitly reflect 
the President’s actions and speeches before the convention, which had been supportive of civil 
rights (Gardner, 2002: 96).  
The ADA submitted a platform that called for the abolition of poll taxes for federal 
elections, legislation to prohibit lynching, a permanent FEPC and desegregation of the military.
68
 
Their platform failed to make it past the platform committee because party leaders hoped to 
prevent increasing tensions with the South. However, liberals used their knowledge of 
convention rules to circumvent party leadership and requested a roll call vote for the platform on 
the floor of the convention. 
As a reaction to the liberal maneuvering, Southerners, lead by former Texas Governor 
Dan Moody, introduced the Moody plank. The Moody plank sought to commit Democrats to the 
idea of “state sovereignty” (Berman, 1970: 84). Moody argued that states had a constitutional 
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right to “regulate and control local affairs” so long as they were mindful of the 14
th
 and 15
th
 
Amendments to the Constitution. Other Southern Democrats introduced the Sims and Sillers 
planks, both of which also made a Constitutional claim of states’ rights. The presence of three 
Southern planks greatly decreased the Southern lobby’s effectiveness. In the end, all three of the 
Southern suggestions for the party platform were rejected as Southerners split their votes among 
the planks. 
While Southerners were unfocused and divided among themselves, members of the ADA 
and other liberals were appealing to the labor lobby and machine organizations from the major 
cities to support the liberal plank (Martin, 1979: 86). They argued two points. First, Democrats 
needed to choose a new direction on the issue of civil rights so the position of the post-New Deal 
party would be clear to all. Second, liberals suggested Democratic politicians at the state and 
local level might be negatively impacted by the convention’s actions with Black voters, whose 
votes were increasingly important to their ability to win elections. Moreover, even if they had not 
already, the machines would eventually benefit from the growing population of Black voters in 
large cities. The liberals who supported the ADA plank were labor and union leaders, like Jack 
Shelly, and Northern politicians like Jacob Arvey. “They came from states that had absorbed 
three-quarters of the Black migration that had strong unions and city machines” (Martin, 1979: 
86). 
In the end, poor planning on the part of Southern politicians and effective lobbying of 
labor and city machines lead to the passage of the most liberal civil rights plank in Democratic 
Party history at the time. The plank proposed by ADA passed by a vote of 651½ to 582½. The 
Southern delegation was so upset by the acceptance of the plank that they walked out of the 
convention. 
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General Election  
Eventually, in spite of protest by Southerners, Truman was nominated for the presidency. 
The party division had implications for the general election; two of the three candidates Truman 
faced in the general election were from own his party. Just after the Democratic National 
Convention, Dixiecrats met and formed the States’ Rights Party, which chose South Carolina 
Governor Strom Thurmond as its nominee. 
Henry Wallace—who was the second-term Vice President of FDR—challenged Truman 
for the Democratic nomination on the Left. Although Wallace was very popular with Black 
voters, Truman was more popular.  
The Republican presidential candidate was New York Governor Thomas Dewey, who 
was also popular with Black voters. On Garner’s account, Dewey was so well liked by Black 
New Yorkers that many supported the Republican Party on other state and local ballots. Building 
on Dewey’s support from the Black community produced a liberal party platform in 1948 with 
hopes of encouraging Black support for Republicans.  
Although the Republican civil rights plank was strong, it was no match for the sitting 
President. Because of his position as President of the United States, he was able to take action 
that his competitors could not on race issues. On July 26, 1948, Truman passed Executive Orders 
9980 and 9981. Executive Order 9980 outlawed discrimination in the federal employment and 
9981 desegregated the military (Berman, 1970: 124). Next, Truman reconvened the Congress to 
handle civil rights issues in July of 1948, as he had promised to do in his acceptance speech on 
July 15.  
These actions helped his position with Black voters but damaged his standing in the 
South. By October of 1948, the Truman campaign changed its electoral focus to large states and 
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went beyond gestures of Executive Orders and large states and made explicit overtures to win 
Black votes.
69
 For example, he traveled to Philadelphia and Harlem in October to address all-
Black crowds.
70
 With his Harlem visit, he became the first sitting President to campaign in 
Harlem. In the Harlem speech, he described the work of the Civil Rights Committee that was 
established a year earlier and reminded attendees of the Executives Orders he implemented in 
July to end segregation in the military and employment discrimination in the federal government. 
He ended his speech by telling Harlem voters that he would “keep moving toward the goal [of 
civil rights] with every ounce of strength and determination I have.”
71
 
Black Ability to Affect Electoral Outcomes 
By most accounts, Truman’s final outreach to Black voters and change in strategy to 
focus on large states paid off. Although most observers predicted a Democratic loss, President 
Truman beat Republican candidate Thomas Dewey with 49.5 percent of the popular vote. 
Truman earned 24,179,345 votes to Dewey’s 21,991,291, but he lost the election in 20 states. 
The election was close, within 5 points, in 19 of those states. The number of Black people in the 
VAP exceeded the margin of victory in each of the most important states. See Table 5.1, below. 
Therefore, I argue that Black voters were essential to the victory of Harry Truman in 1948.
72
 If 
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even a fraction
73
 of the Black voters who did vote for Democrats switched their positions to 
support for the Republican presidential candidates, the Republicans might have won the 1948 
election. Black voters’ contribution to the Truman victory did not go unnoticed by either of the 
political parties. Although they would struggle to deal with attracting Black voters while 
maintaining white support, from 1948 onward, parties fully understood that the Black voting 
bloc had great potential and should be considered as a part of party strategy. 
Table 5.1: Balance of Power in Five States, 1948  
Source: U.S. Census. Detailed Characteristics of the Population. Age and Sex by Race. 
State Total VAP 
Total Black 
VAP 
Numerical 
Margin of 
victory 
Black BOP 
CALIFORNIA 4,994,685 92,273 8,934 yes 
ILLINOIS 5,516,244 269,361 16,807 yes 
MICHIGAN 3,463,730 141,354 17,575 yes 
NEW YORK 9,297,869 402,801 30,481 yes 
PENNSYLVANIA 14,037,504 307,806 74,887 yes 
1952 
Primaries/Candidates 
Although President Truman announced he would not seek the nomination long before the 
convention, the party had not settled on any person as its heir apparent when the national 
convention started in August. The men who were most interested in the position represented 
extremes of the party’s ideologies. Estes Kefauver, a liberal Senator from Tennessee, represented 
liberal opinions on civil rights and Black voters strongly favored him because of this. Holding 
the moderate position was the sitting Vice President, Alben Barkley, a New Deal supporter from 
Kentucky. On the other side was Senator Richard Russell, of Georgia, who supported Southern 
notions of states’ rights. President Truman, along with other Democratic Party leaders, 
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encouraged moderate Illinois Governor Adlai Stevenson to seek the nomination because he 
represented an opportunity for compromise in the party. Although Stevenson took liberal 
positions as governor of Illinois, he did not support the idea of federal intervention to enforce 
desegregation (Sitkoff; 1981: 35). Martin writes, “Adlai was by no means racist;” however, he 
did not align with Northern Democrats on many issues. Despite encouragement from party 
leaders, Stevenson refused to seek the presidency, citing his desire to finish his work in Illinois 
and run for re-election as its governor.
74
 
Convention/Platform  
If the fight over the party platform demonstrates which forces in the party are most 
powerful, 1952 demonstrated that no wing of the Democratic Party had more power than the 
other. Democrats did not have a clear picture of what the party would become. The South still 
opposed progress on civil rights. Northern Democrats still took the opposite position, advocating 
for federal government involvement on issues related to civil rights. 
Liberals came into the convention touting the slogan “Let the South go.”
75
 They sought 
protection from employment discrimination through a compensatory FEPC, anti-lynching 
legislation and modification of Rule Twenty-two.
76
 The liberal argument was that the 1948 
election demonstrated the Democratic Party could win a presidential election without the EC 
votes of the South. Southern states accounted for 159 EC votes in that election, but they only 
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gave 110 of those votes to Truman. If it was possible to win the election without support from 
the South, liberals suggested, the civil rights plank of the 1952 platform should be at least as 
strong as the 1948 platform—if not stronger. 
For a short time, it seemed like the 1952 civil rights plank would be stronger than the 
1948 plank. Initial drafts called for enactment of the President’s civil rights program in the 
Congress and a FEPC with enforcement powers.
77
 However, the liberals who wrote the liberal 
civil rights plank and controlled its destiny from the floor in 1948 were not in control of the 1952 
platform proceedings. Moderates
78
 controlled the party and the platform proceedings in 1952, 
and they were principally concerned with preventing another Southern walkout.  
The proposed 1952 civil rights plank was stronger than the 1948 plank, although its 
words were calmer—lending to different interpretations in different sections of the nation.
79
 The 
1952 platform won praise from some Northerners because it explicitly stated that eliminating 
discrimination would require action in all parts of the nation by individuals, states and localities, 
and the federal government. However, the platform lacked compulsory FEPC language, which 
upset some Black leaders.
80
 Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., who represented the Harlem section of 
New York City and was one of only two Black members of Congress, was most upset by the 
lack of enforcement proposed in the Democratic platform.
81
 Powell understood the electoral 
force of the Black voting bloc, and argued that Black voters’ ability to influence the outcome of 
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elections meant civil rights should be a major consideration of both parties.
82
 In a New York 
Times interview, he explained that the Democratic Party should be responsive to Black voters 
because “Democrats could not have carried California, Florida, Illinois, or Ohio without Negro 
votes they received in such numbers.”
83
 Powell urged Black voters to abstain from pledging their 
support to any nominee until candidates were explicit about their support for FEPC.
84
 He went 
further, threatening he would lead a boycott of the election as a way to show dissatisfaction with 
Stevenson and the Party’s moderate policies if the Democratic Party did not take stronger 
positions on civil rights issues. 
In the end, the tone of the civil rights plank of 1952 was less liberal than it had been in 
1948, but generally acceptable to both sides. Some Northerners found the plank acceptable while 
others thought that it could have stronger language.
85
 To minimize the likelihood of conflict on 
the convention floor, the convention chair accepted the plank with a voice vote immediately after 
it left committee (Berman, 1970: 214).
86
 For the first time in years, Democrats had accepted a 
compromise draft of its civil rights plank without having to consider competing minority reports 
from the Southern conservatives or Northern liberals. 
After settling on a platform, the convention’s next responsibility was choosing a 
presidential candidate. In 1952, the decision about the Party’s nominee was more heavily with 
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party leaders than of the primary election voters. Party leaders sought a candidate who would be 
acceptable to the South and to liberals. Kefauver was too liberal for acceptance by Southern 
Democrats and Russell would not be acceptable to Northerners. Barkley, who could have been a 
viable moderate, was unacceptable to labor. In seeking to avoid a party walkout like the one in 
1948, Democratic leaders chose Adlai Stevenson because he was the candidate who was 
acceptable to most parts of the party. 
Unlike contemporary politics, Democratic positions before the primary were closer to the 
center than their positions after the primary season in 1952. Before the Convention, Democrats 
took positions that were center-Left, with hopes of maintaining some support in the South. Their 
foremost goal was to keep Southern voters from defecting to Republican Presidential Candidate 
Eisenhower. However, Democrats soon realized this positioning hurt their standing with Black 
voters. Further, they had to contend with the likelihood that Black voters might also defect to the 
Republican Party. As the general election drew near, the Democrats moved slightly Left on civil 
rights issues to maintain Black and liberal votes. 
General Election 
Many informed observers and campaign strategists predicted that Black voters might be 
the deciding factor in the lead up to the 1952 election. Therefore, losing ground with Black 
voters could be challenging for a Democratic Party victory. In the 1948 election, the GOP won in 
many of the larger states by margins of 5 points or less. Since then, those large states had 
absorbed the bulk of Southern migrants, and politicians believed if they could capitalize on this 
increase, they would be able to win the election.  
 98 
After the convention, Democrats became increasingly concerned about winning votes in 
large cities and moved back toward the Left. James Reston of the New York Times explains their 
transition: 
In short, Democrats having moved far enough to the right to block General 
Eisenhower’s bid for the South, are now moving cautiously to the left again in 
order to try to block Republican efforts to cut into the Negro and other minority 
votes in the large cities.
87
  
 
Black voters were taking stock of politicians’ civil rights positions, and they promised to 
vote based on their interests—for candidates who supported civil rights. This awareness and 
attention to civil rights positions became problematic for Stevenson, who publicly—and 
repeatedly—stated he did not support civil rights. In an interview with the New York Times, 
Stevenson said he “believ[ed] that the states ought to initiate action to abolish discrimination in 
employment,” and that he opposed a compulsory FEPC bill because it was unnecessary (Berman, 
1970:198). 
Stevenson later realized the potential consequences of his comment for his ability to 
garner Black votes in the North. He changed his public position by August of 1952, saying he 
would use the presidency to lobby for a change in the filibuster rule. When asked about the 
possibility of losing Black voters to the Republican Party he responded, “I can hardly see why 
the Negro would find any refuge in the Republican Party.”
88
 The change in tone had a swift and 
positive impact on his standing with Black leaders and voters. Following the change, Roy 
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Wilkins of the NAACP endorsed him for the presidency. Wilkins commented, “I agree on 
substance but disagree about his tactics.” The Black media followed Wilkins’ for their 1952 
endorsements, which helped Stevenson with Black voters in the end.
89
 
On the other side, Republicans also recognized the potential of the Black voting bloc and 
made appeals for their votes. Liberal Republicans, including Henry Cabot Lodge of MA; Alfred 
Driscoll of NJ; and Irving Ives of NY issued a statement saying that a Republican victory would 
be a boost to the FEPC effort.
90
 By October of 1952, both parties created separate campaigns to 
compete for the Black vote
91
 and produced separate literature for Black voters in the states they 
deemed most important to the election.
92
 
Black Ability to Affect Electoral Outcomes 
The Democratic Party’s winning streak ended in 1952, when Republican candidate 
Dwight Eisenhower defeated Adlai Stevenson to win the election by 2,972,406 votes (or 10.5% 
of the vote). Stevenson lost in all but ten states. Of the seven states where the election was close, 
Stevenson won three. 
Table 5.2: Balance of Power in Five States, 1952  
Source: U.S. Census, Detailed Characteristics of the Population. Age and Sex by Race 
State Total VAP 
Total Black 
VAP 
Numerical 
Margin of 
victory 
Black BOP 
CALIFORNIA 7,323,010 313,455 -349,880 no 
ILLINOIS 6,029,705 439,190 -221,703 yes 
MICHIGAN 4,132,520 292,480 -160,435 yes 
NEW YORK 10,512,395 641,265 -424,105 yes 
PENNSYLVANIA 7,097,210 416,310 -134,759 yes 
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Black voters were the BOP in all of the large EC states except California. See Table 5.2, 
above. Although Stevenson won a majority of Black votes, many of them voted for Dwight 
Eisenhower. The BVAP of Illinois, Michigan, New York and Pennsylvania
93
 exceeded the 
number and percentage of votes needed to change the election. The number of votes needed to 
change the outcome of the election was less than the number of BVAP in California. Keeping all 
else constant, if no Black voters had defected, Stevenson may have won the 1952 election. 
1956 
In May of 1954—halfway between presidential campaigns—the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruled in the landmark Brown v. Board of Education case that “separate but equal has no place” in 
public education.
94
 The issue of desegregation grew in political importance, as Southerners 
refused to accept the ruling to integrate their schools and politicians at all levels took no action to 
support the ruling. Sensing the Republican Party could make progress on this issue in the South, 
President Eisenhower also decided to take no action to support the Court’s ruling (Sitkoff, 1981: 
31). Other civil rights issues of importance during the 1956 election cycle were anti-lynching, 
Black voter protection legislation and elimination of the poll tax. 
Primaries/Candidates  
Adlai Stevenson was mostly quiet on civil rights issues after the 1952 campaign. When 
he did speak, he gave speeches that articulated his centrist positions on civil rights and upset 
Black voters. For example, while speaking to a Black audience in Los Angeles on the topic of 
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Brown v. Board in February of 1956, he advocated for gradual integration.
95
 Although many 
liberals proposed cutting funding for schools that refused to comply with the court’s decision, 
Stevenson said he would not cut off funding to segregated schools and would also not use the 
resources of the federal government to enforce integration if he was elected President. As 
another example, when asked about how Southerners could work toward integration, he 
suggested to an audience of Black voters in Los Angeles that the approach must be gradual. He 
went on to say in a different setting “we cannot by the stroke of a pen reverse customs and 
traditions that are older than the Republic,” and that “true integration requires a change in the 
hearts and minds of men.”
96
 
Estes Kefauver maintained his liberal positions in the lead up to the 1956 campaign, 
repeatedly stating his support for the Brown decision. Martin (1979:138) quotes his personal 
papers, “The Supreme Court is the final authority on Constitutional matters. When it rendered its 
school decision, that decision was and is the law of the land… I think the President ought to 
exert his own influence and good offices.” Although the Democratic front-runners differed in 
opinions, and Kefauver was popular in his own right, he chose to end his presidential campaign 
early in the season. Stevenson was still very popular with the Democratic Party leadership. 
Kefauver calculated he would have a better chance of getting to the White House if he 
abandoned his candidacy and pushed instead for the opportunity to become the vice presidential 
nominee.  
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Once Kefauver was out of the race, Averell Harriman—who had also declared candidacy 
in 1952—was alone on the Left. During the Truman administration, Harriman worked as a 
Special Assistant to the President (1950-1951) and as the director of the Mutual Security 
Agency
97
 from 1951-1953. He was elected governor of New York in 1954. Harriman was the 
only candidate pushing Stevenson to take liberal positions in 1956. Although he was a Truman 
appointee, President Truman chose not to endorse Harriman for president because of his far Left 
positions in 1952 (Berman, 1970: 203). Truman changed his mind in 1956 and endorsed 
Harriman to show his displeasure with Stevenson’s moderate positions (Martin, 1979: 146). 
Convention/Platform 
Again in 1956, liberals saw the platform as a potential opportunity to articulate the new 
direction of the party. Support for Brown v. Board was the barometer for liberalism in 1956, and 
Democrats knew they would have to address the Supreme Court’s decision in their platform. 
Conversely, Southerners hoped for a platform that would suggest moderation and patience as the 
key to ending segregation. In other words, they wanted the platform to state that compliance with 
Brown should not be mandatory. 
The first civil rights plank (the majority plank) from the platform committee was more 
liberal than the platform of 1952. The drafters’ goal was to address liberal concerns without 
upsetting the Southern delegation too much. However, Adlai Stevenson faced a nomination 
challenge from Averell Harriman.
98
 Harriman sought to make the platform even more liberal 
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than the committee proposed as a way to separate himself from Stevenson as a “true liberal.” 
Stevenson responded to Harriman by moving even further to the Left on civil rights, and stating 
that the platform should support the court’s decision in Brown v. Board. The Democrats ended 
up with a platform that acknowledged the issues of segregation but did not advocate for 
implementation of the court’s decision. Harriman’s influence was enough to bring 
acknowledgment of segregation into the platform but not enough to buck the South and advocate 
for integration in the platform. In the end, the 1956 plank was stronger than 1952, even without 
support for federal intervention on segregation. It might have been even stronger if the 
convention change allowed a roll call vote (Martin, 1979: 151). However, he employed a voice 
vote, and adopted the mainstream plank, which was not radical, but was progress over 1952.  
The South had no favorite representative in the 1956 election. Southerners were unhappy 
with Stevenson’s shift to the Left, but they realized he was their best hope for any representation 
in the party. The closest thing they got to a “states’ rights” candidate was Senator John F. 
Kennedy (JFK) of Massachusetts, who sought the vice presidential nomination. Kennedy 
expressed opinions on Brown that were acceptable to the South—suggesting Southerners move 
with “deliberate speed” and that desegregation should be “left to the judgment of lower Federal 
Courts as to when it should be carried out” (Brauer, 1977: 18). 
Although there was still much room for progress on the issue, the 1956 party as a whole 
was much more liberal on civil rights than ever before. There was no conservative candidate on 
the Right to pull Stevenson back to the center. With no other candidates in the running for the 
nomination, Stevenson kept moving Left on civil rights until he appeased enough Democratic 
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delegates to give him the nomination—which they eventually did.  However, he was careful not 
to go too far left because Southern Democrats could defect to the GOP in the general election. 
General Election 
Stevenson’s move leftward on civil rights occurred gradually between 1952 and 1956, 
with most of the change occurring during the primary season of the 1956 election. After moving 
to keep up with Kefauver in the primaries, and going even further to keep Harriman at bay 
during the convention, Stevenson was far more liberal by the general election campaign of 1956 
than he had been in the primaries or in 1952 cycle. He went from describing civil rights as 
something that should be gradual and not happening by force, to saying that he would take action 
to enforce civil rights if he was elected President. In one post-convention interview, Stevenson 
remarked that he didn’t know what “moderation” was and told the Black owned and operated 
Chicago Defender that he would “base his campaign on the fundamental proposition that a 
person’s rights cannot depend in any way on his race, his creed, or his color.”
99
 
Republicans always believed they might have won the 1948 campaign if they had just a 
little more support from Black voters.
100
 They understood that Black votes would be a necessary 
part of their coalition if they were going to win in 1956. Attorney General, Herbert Brownell 
“calculated that [Black people] held a balance of power in seven states that cast 197 Electoral 
College ballots, as well as in some 60 Congressional districts” (Sitkoff, 1981; 33). 
Eisenhower aides proposed that he begin the work on a civil rights bill as a way to expose 
the rift on civil rights issues in the Democratic Party. He declined for fear he would lose 
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Southern votes. Although he would like to have Black votes, his ultimate goal was to make the 
Republican Party the home of Southern white voters. Democrats were relieved he decided not to 
undertake civil rights. The Party was increasingly hurt by the positions of its Southern partisans. 
Black voters believed Southern Democrats were stifling progress for the race.   
While the positions of Southern Democrats hurt the Party’s chances with Black voters, 
growing numbers were motivated to support the Republican ticket because of the progress on 
racial issues between 1952-1956. Eisenhower benefitted from the fact that Brown v. Board 
happened during his first term in office. His administration also touted desegregation of the 
military and facilities in Washington, D.C. as accomplishments. Eisenhower got a bump in votes 
from the work of Adam Clayton Powel on his behalf in Harlem.  Another consideration is the 
economy, which was doing well at the time of the 1956 elections and affected the decision of 
some middle class Black voters (Burk, 1984:169). Based on interviews with Black voters in 
communities across the country and the list of prominent Black leaders who endorsed 
Eisenhower for the presidency, media outlets predicted a defection to the Republican Party and 
they were right.
101
 
Black Ability to Affect Electoral Outcomes 
The second match-up of President Dwight Eisenhower and Democratic candidate Adlai 
Stevenson was a more crushing defeat for the Democrats than the first. Stevenson lost in all but 
seven states, earning only 73 EC votes and 42 percent of the popular vote. Despite the lopsided 
vote, Black voters maintained a numerical BOP in four large EC states: California, Illinois, 
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Michigan and Pennsylvania. Only in New York was the numerical margin greater than the Black 
population.  
The elections results from 1956 showed an increased in the number of Black voters 
supporting the Republican ticket.
102
 A Gallup poll, released in January of 1957, said the Black 
vote for the GOP increased by 18 percent from 1952 (Moon, 1957). By early Republican 
estimates, they only needed a 5-10 percent shift in Black votes to change the outcome of 
congressional elections. 
[Eisenhower’s] biggest percentage gain – 16.6 percent – came in New York's 16th 
District (Harlem), which was 86.8 percent Negro in 1950 – the second biggest 
Negro district in the country. The district's Congressman, Rep. Adam C. Powell 
Jr. (D N.Y.), broke with his party in 1956 to support and campaign for Mr. 
Eisenhower's reelection. In the biggest Negro district in the country, Illinois' 1st 
(Chicago), which was 91.7 percent Negro in 1950, Mr. Eisenhower scored a gain 
of 10.9 percent. However, in the third largest Negro district, Pennsylvania's 4th 
(Philadelphia), which was 44.8 percent Negro in 1950, Mr. Eisenhower gained 
only 1.2 percent from 1952. All three of these districts were carried by 
Stevenson.
103
 
Table 5.3: Balance of Power in Five States, 1960  
Source: U.S. Census. Detailed Characteristics of the Population. Age and Sex by Race. 
State 
Total # of 
citizens in 
VAP 
Total Black 
VAP # 
Numerical 
Margin of 
victory 
Black BOP 
CALIFORNIA 7,323,010 313,455 -303,766 yes 
ILLINOIS 6,029,705 439,190 -423,822 yes 
MICHIGAN 4,132,520 292,480 -176,874 yes 
NEW YORK 10,512,395 641,265 -798,780 no 
PENNSYLVANIA 7,097,210 416,310 -301,741 yes 
 
1960 
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After the 1956 election, both parties believed Black votes were truly up for grabs and 
supported civil rights legislation so they could say they were the party that secured the 
legislation. President Eisenhower’s Attorney General, Herbert Brownell, proposed civil rights 
legislation as a way to win support from Black voters and highlight the divisions in the 
Democratic Party in early 1956. However, like the Democrats, Eisenhower was also concerned 
with the message he would send to the South by advocating for civil rights legislation. He 
encouraged the Attorney General to hold off on civil rights until after the 1956 election, and soon 
after their victory, the Eisenhower administration got back to work on civil rights legislation 
(Sitkoff, 1984: 34). Under the leadership of LBJ, the Congress passed—and President 
Eisenhower signed—the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 in September. Although the bill lacked much 
of the power civil rights leaders and liberals hoped it would have, it was the first piece of civil 
rights legislation in 100 years. The legislation also gave both parties the opportunity to argue 
their party was committed to civil rights—Republicans for proposing and signing the legislation 
and Democrats for moving it through the Congress. 
Later in September of 1957, President Eisenhower scored another victory in the minds of 
Black voters when he reluctantly took action to enforce the Brown decision by activating the 
National Guard to desegregate Little Rock, Arkansas’ Central High School. Eisenhower’s 
decision increased support for the Republican Party among the Black community and 
Republicans thought Black voters might continue shifting their votes away from Democrats in 
1960.
104
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In 1960, the Democratic Party slate of primary candidates included a host of liberals and 
a Southerner who sought to cast off his roots and be considered as a liberal. Adlai Stevenson—
the Democratic presidential candidate of the last two elections—announced he was not interested 
in the Democratic nomination. However, his supporters built a campaign with the hope he would 
run again. 
Hubert Humphrey was very liberal Senator from Minnesota, who had been instrumental 
in drafting the liberal civil rights plank of the 1948 Democratic convention. His liberal positions 
made him very popular with Black voters. He expressed interest in a national political position 
during the 1956 elections, and hoped that Stevenson would choose him as a running mate. 
However, Estes Kefauver ended up getting the 1956 vice presidential nomination. JFK followed 
Kefauver in votes and popularity for the vice-presidential spot—Humphrey, interested though he 
may be, was not a serious contender for that nomination. Therefore, Humphrey, along with 
James Rowe, decided he should seek the presidential nomination of 1960 by winning primary 
elections (White, 1961: 34). However, by the summer, Humphrey dropped out of the presidential 
race and sought to keep his seat in the United States Senate. 
Stuart Symington also served in the Senate, representing Missouri. Symington was not 
well known outside his home state and had not taken any positions in his time as a Senator that 
would be problematic to Black voters. In his time on the campaign trail, he made it clear he held 
liberal positions on civil rights issues. Responding to President Truman’s disapproval of the 
lunch counter sit-ins, he commented “[m]y basic premise is that every citizen of the United 
States should have all the rights of any other citizen—all the rights. We can have no second-class 
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citizens in our country.”
105
 He did not believe he could be successful in political primaries and 
thought he might be able to achieve nomination through building relationships with party 
leaders. In his estimation, he stood a strong chance of becoming the Democrat’s presidential 
nominee if, for some reason, the Convention was divided on their candidates (White, 1961: 38).  
Senate Majority Leader LBJ also had presidential aspirations, but did not acknowledge 
his intentions until January of 1960—late in the primary election process (Caro, 2012: 73). 
Johnson was unpopular with Black voters, who were skeptical of him because of his Southern 
roots and positions on civil rights during his early political career. Further, many Black leaders 
and white liberals felt he compromised too much by allowing Southerners to remove the section 
on discrimination in public accommodations from the Civil Rights Act of 1957. Johnson figured 
he might be able to overcome his difficulty with Northern Democrats and Black voters if he was 
able to follow up on his promises to strengthen the civil rights legislation during 1960. 
JFK began working on the presidential nomination not long after his defeat for the vice-
presidential nomination in 1956. If not for the candidacy of a Southern Democrat—Albert Gore 
of Tennessee—he might have gotten enough votes to win the vice presidential nomination. 
Kennedy’s 1956 experience taught him that a good relationship with the South could pave the 
way for his nomination in 1960. In response, he nurtured relationships with Southern Senators 
and Representatives. In Washington, he voted with the Southerners on civil rights issues. 
However, his relationship building extended beyond Washington as he made frequent visits to 
the South—often speaking on everything except civil rights issues. When he was pressed to talk 
about civil rights, he expressed a view that moderation was the appropriate course of action. 
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Kennedy’s statements on civil rights issues grew more liberal as party leaders and 
Kennedy campaign officials realized the vote would be close and Black voters might be more 
likely to support the Republican ticket. He used a more liberal tone with Black voters, while he 
also spoke to Southerners in ways that indicated his support for their position. For example, he 
made seemingly contradictory statements in June of 1960 during and following a speech to the 
Liberal Party of New York. He told liberals “moral persuasion by the president can be more 
effective than force in ending discrimination against Negroes” (Brauer, 1977:33). All along, 
Southern Democrats and supporters—including Adlai Stevenson at one point—had argued it was 
impossible to legislate emotions or to use government to change people’s feelings. Kennedy 
went further trying to create distance from the South and said “he hoped to win the Democratic 
presidential nomination without a single Southern vote in the Convention.”
 106
 When Robert 
Kennedy heard about these comments, he advised that it might seem like he no longer wanted 
Southern support. Day later, John Kennedy made a revised statement to Southern delegates 
telling them, “I would be happy and proud to receive support from delegates from any part of the 
United States” (Brauer, 1979: 34). 
Convention/Platform 
Concern about getting the Black vote and commitment to liberal ideals worked together 
through Chester Bowles to produce a strong civil rights plank for the 1960 election. Bowles, one 
of the Kennedy campaign men, wrote a very liberal platform under the assumption that party 
leaders would make it more moderate (Brauer, 1971: 35).  The 1960 platform was completely re-
written from what existed in 1956, although it did carry forward the major themes. Of central 
                                                 
106
 Kennedy Assures Liberals He Seeks No Help in South: KENNEDY SEEKING NO SOUTHERN AID By LEO EGAN New 
York Times (1923-Current file); Jun 24, 1960; ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009) pg. 1. 
 111 
concern were rights related to voting and elimination of discrimination in education, 
accommodations, housing and employment. The platform also described the need for rule 
changes in Congress. Southerners submitted a minority plank, but the convention accepted the 
Bowles plank.  In the end, Kennedy won the presidential nomination even though the bulk of 
support from the South went to LBJ. 
Kennedy added LBJ to the ticket as his running mate. There are many accounts of his 
reasoning. One explanation was that Johnson created a balanced ticket. It was highly unlikely 
that Kennedy could defeat Richard Nixon without Southern support—especially support from 
Texas and its large EC delegation. Further, adding LBJ to the ticket would help them appear to 
be ideologically and regionally balanced (Brauer, 1977). Another account is that LBJ could help 
Kenney with Congressional battles. He told one of his aides “I won’t be able to live with Johnson 
as the [minority] Leader” (Caro, 2012: 123). Another argument was that the vice presidential 
position would be inconsequential because Kennedy was young, and it was very unlikely he 
would die in office (Caro, 2012: 126).  
Black leaders, liberals and important figures in the labor movement were very displeased 
with Kennedy’s choice of Johnson as a running mate. As far as they could tell, save his work on 
the 1957 Civil Rights Act, LBJ was not a liberal and did not have progressive views on civil 
rights issues. 
One tabulation found that between 1940 and 1960, Johnson ‘voted as a 
Southerner,’ with the other Southerners, no less than thirty-nine times on matters 
of civil rights: six times against proposals to abolish the poll tax, six times against 
legislation to prohibit and punish lynching, twice to support segregation in the 
Armed Forces, once against a Federal Fair employment practices commission, 
once to maintain segregation in the District of Columbia.
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Some suggest that Johnson was never deeply steeped in Southern traditions 
(Leuchtenburg 2005). He took positions that were anti-civil rights to represent the beliefs of his 
white constituents, and maintain his relationships with Southern members of Congress and the 
Senate. However, Johnson knew he would need to express moderate positions as a vice 
presidential candidate with aspirations of becoming President of the United States. 
General Election 
Both the Kennedy and the Nixon campaigns recognized the importance of Black voters 
for the coming campaign. In a 1960 interview with Ebony magazine, they both described how 
important Black voters were to their strategy. Nixon commented: 
I am convinced that the future of the Republican Party today lies in pressing 
forward on civil rights. In any one of the ‘big six’ states (New York, California, 
Pennsylvania, Michigan, Illinois and Ohio) our civil rights stand can make all the 
difference in the world. In the last election we lost the governorship of 
Pennsylvania by about 50,000 votes. A shift of just 5 percent of the Negro vote 
would have elected a Republican.
108
 
Kennedy commented: 
I’d be a fool not to consider the Negro vote crucial. We’ve got to carry the key 
northern and western states or we’re just not going to win…All I ask is that 
people will look at my views, will look at my record, and will look at my stand. 
The Kennedy campaign saw obtaining the Black vote as an essential part of their 
strategy, and took other steps to make Black voters comfortable with Kennedy. They practiced 
integration at campaign meetings and allowed the Black press to travel with their press corps 
(Brauer, 1979: 46). The campaign also had a dedicated Black campaign working-group known as 
the “civil rights section,” whose goal was to garner Black support through various forms of 
media and to register and turn out Black voters.  
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Voter registration was an important component of Kennedy’s campaign strategy. The 
campaign estimated there were 40 million eligible, unregistered voters, and 70 percent of those 
were Democrats (Rorabraugh, 2009). They were also keenly aware of the fact that Black voters 
participated at a rate that was comparable to their white cohorts, if not higher. On this issue, 
Louis Harris, a pollster for the Kennedy campaign said “The fact that Negroes…make it their 
business to vote is a key political fact. For it highlights the intense political feeling among 
Negroes in America today.”
109
 By 1960, nearly half of the Black population lived outside the 
South, and the campaign calculated that increasing the number of Black voters in the base would 
be helpful towards winning large states.  
Kennedy sought to register new voters by working with local parties, but they met 
resistance in some areas.  For example, although the campaign calculated that Black voters 
would be key to delivering victory in New York, the local Democratic Party was not interested in 
mobilizing new voters because it would upset the balance of their municipal and state elections.  
New York Democrats refused to help with the registration efforts. The campaign circumvented 
the local party machines to register and mobilize these voters by working with labor unions and 
activating the Citizens for Kennedy organization. In New York, they gained 500,000 
(Rorabraugh, 2009). 
During the fall campaign, JFK got an unexpected opportunity to make inroads with the 
Black community. After Martin Luther King (MLK) was arrested in Georgia, he called Coretta 
Scott King. JFK scored a political victory because mainstream media did not cover the event, 
and he won approval from Black leaders for coming to MLK’s aide while evading backlash from 
                                                 
109
 Louis Harris, Is There a Republican Majority? (1954). p.152. via Shaffer, H. B. (1956). Racial issues in national politics. 
Editorial research reports 1956 (Vol. I). Washington, DC: CQ Press. Retrieved from 
http://library.cqpress.com.libezproxy2.syr.edu/cqresearcher/cqresrre1956041800 . 
 114 
the Southern wing of the party. The campaign used the call to their advantage in their outreach to 
Black voters. Kennedy’s civil rights section created and distributed a pamphlet just before the 
election, and framed the event as a public demonstration of JFK’s position on race.  
Black Ability to Affect Electoral Outcomes 
The 1960 competition between Democrat JFK and Republican Richard M. Nixon was 
one of the closest in U.S. history, with Kennedy beating Nixon by a fraction of the popular vote 
and 84 EC votes. The BVAP was higher than was needed to change the outcome of the election. 
In the end, JFK won more Black support than Stevenson in 1956, but not more than Stevenson 
received in 1952 (White, 1961: 354). “Gallup estimated that Kennedy garnered 68 percent of the 
Negro vote, a 7 percent improvement over Stevenson’s last showing” (Brauer, 1979; 59). 
Approximately 250,000 Black voters supported Kennedy in Illinois and Michigan, where 
he won by 9,000 votes and 67,000 votes, respectively.  Kennedy also carried Pennsylvania and 
New York.  His biggest gains were in four of the five large cities of the states under 
consideration here, where “his local margin exceeded his national popular vote margin.” 
(Rorabraugh, 2002: 179). His margins were 791,120 in New York; 456,312 in Chicago; 331,544 
in Philadelphia; and 311,721 in Detroit.  Kennedy’s calculations about needing support in big 
states and increasing the total number of voters were correct. 
Following the campaign, Richard Nixon acknowledged that Back voters might have been 
the balance of power in the election of 1960.  In a 1962 interview with Ebony he said, “I could 
have become president.  I needed only five percent more votes in the Negro areas.” He went on, 
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“I could have gotten them if I had campaigned harder.”
110
  Although Nixon acknowledged the 
power of the Black vote, his party would take a vastly different direction in the next election. 
Table 5.4: Balance of Power, 1960  
Sources: U.S. Census. Detailed Characteristics of the Population. Age and Sex by Race. 
State 
Total # of 
citizens in 
VAP 
Total Black 
VAP # 
Numerical 
Margin of 
victory 
Black BOP 
CALIFORNIA 9,855,380 503,844 -17,811 yes 
ILLINOIS 6,388,858 589,494 4,430 yes 
MICHIGAN 4,667,085 401,737 33,422 yes 
NEW YORK 11,057,832 879,774 191,834 yes 
PENNSYLVANIA 7,220,559 502,044 58,164 yes 
 
After 1960 
After 1960, Kennedy was sluggish in his approach to civil rights. He did not follow 
through on the promises of the campaign. Members of Congress, who would have to answer to 
their constituents in 1962, pressured him to move on civil rights issues. They encouraged him to 
submit a Civil Rights bill. They also encouraged him to move quickly on legislation to prevent 
discrimination in housing, something he had promised he could do “with the stroke of a pen.” 
Other individuals in the administration also suggested that Kennedy should move on civil rights 
issues. Louis Martin repeatedly wrote to Ted Sorensen that the party was facing tough elections 
and that Black voters were an important voting bloc. Archival data also confirms Kennedy’s 
desire to move slowly on civil rights. Sorensen wrote a letter to Harris Wofford suggesting that 
they “keep civil rights on ice.” However, they were concerned about harnessing the power of 
Black voters for the 1962 election. Therefore, Kennedy created the Voter Education Project 
(VEP), which ran from 1962-1964. 
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President Kennedy was assassinated in November of 1963, and LBJ moved at full speed 
to pass civil rights legislation after his death. The assassination gave Johnson one year to prepare 
for the 1964 election. Like Kennedy in 1960, one of Johnson’s primary strategic considerations 
was voter registration for Black people throughout the nation. The DNC looked for places 
outside the South with Black populations of 10 percent or more. They realized it was possible to 
win without the South, but they knew that they would have to mobilize more of their coalition in 
other places to achieve victory without their old cornerstone. 
Conclusion 
My argument in this chapter has been that Democrats might be very concerned about 
meeting the needs of Black voters if they were the BOP in elections. I found that Black voters 
were the BOP in 18 out of 20 instances between 1948 and 1960. I also found that the Democratic 
Party was aware of the strength of the Black voting bloc and made efforts to garner their support. 
Their efforts included race-based appeals in Black media and seeking support of Black leaders. 
During the period of interest, Democrats also worked to win Black votes by creating policies that 
allowed for federal government intervention to end discrimination in a number of areas. 
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 Chapter Six: Conclusion 
My dissertation began as an attempt to understand why LBJ was so liberal on civil rights 
issues after having voted against civil rights measures as a younger politician. I thought the Great 
Migration might be an excellent explanation. All of the books I read on Democratic Party change 
during this time alluded to the significance of the Great Migration for the political parties from 
1948 onward. However, none of the books had it as the center of their focus. My goal in this 
dissertation has been to create a space for the Great Migration among the other explanations of 
Democratic Party change. 
Although my idea began with LBJ and 1964, I learned along the way that most of the 
action in the story of Democratic Party change—and of the Great Migration—took place before 
1964. Democrats were slowly becoming more liberal on racial issues long before LBJ made the 
final push after JFK’s assignation. Likewise, much of the second wave of the Great Migration 
also came before 1964. I shifted my focus once it became clear to me that local politics was 
important to motivating the national party’s evolution on this issue and that the real action in this 
story occurred between 1948 and 1960. 
Democrats, who had struggled to attain the presidency before FDR came to office in 
1932, won decreasing shares of the popular vote following FDR’s high in 1936. They barely won 
the 1948 presidential election and failed to win a majority in 1952 and 1956 before winning the 
1960 election by the smallest margin in history. After the New Deal, the Democrats were divided 
on the appropriate direction of the party with Southerners believing the party should stay its 
course. In their minds, they could keep their commitment to states’ rights and Northerners should 
be happy with the increasingly active federal government. At the same time, the growing 
sentiment in the North was that Southerners were wrong in their commitment to states’ rights 
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and it was the responsibility of the increasingly active government to protect Black Americans 
from violence and discrimination. 
While this war occurred in the Democratic Party, Black Americans left the South in 
record numbers. Millions of them moved to large, Northern cities with the hope of making a new 
life for themselves.  When they arrived in the cities, they frequently found the promises of the 
North were more complicated than advertised. In spite of these issues, they were excited about 
their ability to participate in the political process—often for the first time. 
Local parties, who were the first to interact with migrants, dealt with the influx of voters 
in a number of ways that varied based on the localities. In cities with strong party 
organizations—like Chicago and Philadelphia—local parties worked to register the migrants and 
to mobilize them for their benefit. In New York—which also had strong party organizations—the 
dominant political organization, Tammany Hall, sought to suppress Black involvement in local 
politics. Therefore, many migrants participated in politics through third parties.  In cities without 
strong party systems—like Los Angeles and Detroit—the parties did not make coordinated 
efforts to register and mobilize Black voters. 
Regardless of party strength, the political organizations in cities quickly realized that 
Black voters had the potential to change the outcome of local elections and changed their 
behavior to reflect this fact. In Philadelphia, for example, this meant targeted outreach to Black 
voters and promises to promote civil rights policies. In Los Angeles, this manifested as public 
acknowledgement of Black voting power and appointment of Black people to municipal 
positions. Black voters’ position as the balance of power also had positive impact on their ability 
to hold elected office. In all five cities, Black people achieved elected office by the 1960s. 
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Black voters’ involvement at the local level impacted the Democratic Party at the 
national level. Local politicians were sensitive to positions of Black voters because they had 
experience with them as the balance of power in local elections. In some instances, at party 
conventions or via correspondence for example, local politicians beseeched the national party to 
take liberal positions on race issues. They argued that the behavior of Southern Democrats 
negatively impacted their ability to maintain Black support at the local level. Based on this kind 
of encouragement from local Democrats, it makes sense that the national party might be willing 
to shift its position on civil rights. 
On top of prodding from local politicians, the national Democratic Party—especially 
presidential candidates—had to deal with the reality that migrants constituted a balance of power 
in national elections. Through migration, they had become a sizeable percentage of the voting 
age population in states that were important to presidential politics. In most instances, there were 
enough Black voters living and registered to vote in cities that could determine the outcome of 
states with large Electoral College delegations. Recognizing the potential of this vote, 
Democratic presidential candidates were careful to seek Black support while trying not to 
alienate Southern voters. Their gestures ranged from executive orders to desegregate the military 
(Truman) to public reversal of positions on the idea of “moderation” (Stevenson) and promises to 
create policies that would end discrimination in housing (Kennedy). 
In this dissertation, I have examined information political actors would have considered 
during this time to make the case that the aforementioned changes and gestures were partly a 
response to the mass migration of Black people out of the South. Given politicians’ knowledge 
of demographic changes and desire to win the Electoral College by winning popular majorities in 
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large states, it is logical to infer Democrats changed their positions to support civil rights as a 
way to win over Black voters. 
I think it is important to explicitly acknowledge other things were happening in the 
environment, and I would be remiss not to mention the other pressures on political actors that 
came from the growing momentum of the civil rights movement. It is also important to note that 
some of the Democratic Party’s action was driven by the desire for a change on civil rights issues 
from White liberals in the North. Although these two factors in the environment, along with 
others, contributed to the Democratic Party’s change, my primary objective has been to make the 
case that the Great Migration is an equally important consideration. The Democratic Party was 
looking for ways to expand its base and ensure that they could win in elections of 1948, 1952, 
1956, and 1960. One way to expand the base was to incorporate Black voters, who could serve as 
a source of votes, and the Great Migration grew the potential base by millions of voters. 
To win these new voters, Democrats needed to change their public positions on civil 
rights issues to ones that were less hostile to Black interests. Party leaders would have to make 
statements in support of civil rights. To keep their positions, local party leaders would need to 
enlist the support of Black voters. Further, the party would need to allow Black people to hold 
offices themselves. At the national level, the Party would have to articulate support for civil 
rights in its platform, which served as an official campaign document and was one of the few 
documents in the Democratic Party that clearly described the party’s position. The Party’s 
presidential and vice presidential candidates would need to have, or simulate, positions that were 
supportive of civil rights. In short, my goal was not simply to describe Democratic Party change, 
but to highlight the importance of migration in contributing to that change. 
What are the Implications of this Work for Political Science? 
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Getting back to the political science concept of realignment, we should describe Black 
voters’ movement into the Democratic Party as a case of slow-going change in party attachment 
and identification. Alternatively, we could accept that the Black population of voters changed 
their party affiliations rapidly but we would need to acknowledge that the change was not 
entirely a result of conversion (See: Andersen, 1979). Just like other movers who came before 
them, migrants were unimmunized voters. As such, when they registered as Democrats in 
Chicago or Republicans in Philadelphia, they were choosing a party affiliation for the first time. 
In other words, regardless of the rate of change, one significant point of this work is that Black 
voters were not converting from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party in many instances 
from 1948-1964.  Instead, their statuses were changing from non-voter to voter from nonpartisan 
to Democrat. 
So What: Why Does This Project Matter? 
This study is important for at least three reasons: its period of interest and focus on the 
Great Migration and on Northern cities. First, it is important because it focuses on an important 
period of time that, until recently, did not receive much attention from scholars. Many political 
science volumes focus on Democratic Party change after 1965 (Frymer; Carmines & Stimson, 
1984) due to influence by historians who wrote about the “major change” in the party being tied 
up with LBJ and the second Reconstruction as well as MLK and the Civil Rights Movement of 
the 1960s (Sitkoff, 1981). There is also a small body of work that considers Black voters during 
reconstruction and in the New Deal era. Conversely, this work is a part of a growing body of 
work that recognizes that the political parties were changing long before the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  This study calls attention to the post-war era, from 
1948-1964, which is important because it serves as a ramping up period for the height of the civil 
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rights movement of the 1960s and as the foundation for the “Republican realignment/ Southern 
strategy.” 
Second, this study rightly puts the Great Migration front and center in the discussion of 
Democratic Party change. Scholars should not reduce this movement of millions of people from 
one part of the nation to another to a few lines in their larger narrative. This study is important 
because it considers the impact of the second wave of the Great Migration. Where scholars have 
written about the Great Migration, they have tended to focus on the first wave—occurring from 
1900-1930. The second wave is important because it brings far more Southerners to the North 
than does the first wave. By extension, I argue, the nation could feel the effects of the second 
wave of migration more than they did during the first wave. 
Third, more broadly than the Great Migration, this project is important as description of 
the political importance of demographic change.  All too often, we focus on the actors and 
organizations and the people en masse without thinking about what might be happening in the 
lives of those people.  Movement is an important part of American life and, therefore, we should 
consider it thoughtfully as we think about how people shape their political decisions and choose 
their leaders. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
I thoroughly enjoyed researching and writing chapter four. As I mention in the chapter, I 
picked five cities—Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, New York and Philadelphia—based on their 
size, location and dominant political party. However, migrants were similarly integrated into 
local politics in a host of other cities. I would guess they might have been even more effective in 
their attempts to be elected to office and participate in politics in medium-sized cities of the 
North or larger cities in Border States. Future research could examine the impact of the Great 
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Migration on local politics on cities like Baltimore, MD; Cleveland, OH; St. Louis, MO; 
Pittsburg, PA; Paterson, NJ; Oakland, CA; and Washington, D.C. 
Understanding party change, in terms of migration, is important because the population is 
always changing. Although not a direct parallel, the influx of Hispanic immigrants into America 
and of their citizen children into adulthood in some ways resembles the Great Migration. As we 
observed in 2012, parties must work to interpret these changes in the population. This could 
mean they have to change their positions on issues, encourage different types of people to run—
who look like the new groups—and/or change the way they construct their electoral strategies. 
Finally, a different kind of contemporary population change, directly related to the Great 
Migration, is the trend among Black Americans since the 1980s to return to the South.
111
 This 
“return migration” has political implications for states in the South that turned Republican 
between the 1960s-1990s. States like North Carolina and Georgia, which thoroughly converted 
to red states in the 1980s and 1990s, are turning purple as their major cities absorb a Southern 
moving, Democratic Black population. As Black people continue moving back to the South, 
politicians at the local, state and national levels will have to change their strategies to account for 
their movement.
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